Soon after the July Uprising ended the 15-year dictatorship of Sheikh Hasina, demands for state reforms grew louder among people who had long cherished the dream of a vibrant democracy. They genuinely wanted to ensure that the country would never again fall under authoritarian rule.

In response to these aspirations, the interim government led by Nobel laureate Professor Muhammad Yunus formed a National Consensus Commission, bringing together political parties to develop a roadmap for state reforms in line with the spirit of the Uprising.

After lengthy discussions on various constitutional and institutional reforms, the commission produced a historic consensus-based document titled the July National Charter.

Exactly one year ago today, on October 17, 2025, political parties signed the Charter at a grand ceremony at the South Plaza of the National Parliament Building.

Months later, on February 12 this year, the BNP-led alliance came to power following an election that observers described as “credible and competitive”.

Illinois State University Distinguished Professor Dr Ali Riaz served as vice-chairman of the National Consensus Commission and also headed the Constitution Reform Commission under the interim government.

On the first anniversary of the July National Charter’s signing, Dr Riaz spoke candidly with Daily Waadaa about the new government’s approach to the Charter, the future of state reforms and other related issues.

Waadaa: It has been exactly one year since the signing of the July National Charter. The ceremony at the South Plaza of the National Parliament Building was quite grand. You described the charter as a document embodying the aspirations of the mass uprising. You were at the centre of that commission as its vice-chairman. Looking back, how would you assess the journey?

Professor Ali Riaz: The July National Charter truly embodies the long-standing aspirations of the people of Bangladesh for state reform. State reform cannot be achieved through a single charter or document. It requires a foundation, and the July National Charter has laid that foundation.

At the signing ceremony, I reminded everyone that the charter was a pact between political parties and the people. Every political party that participated in the process was explicitly committed to state reform at the time. It was on the basis of that commitment that they entered into an agreement with the people.

The aspirations of the people remain unchanged because they did not emerge overnight. Since independence, Bangladeshis have aspired to build an accountable state. That aspiration grew particularly during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, when we witnessed authoritarianism and the destruction of state institutions. People wanted those institutions rebuilt and made accountable. The July National Charter reflects those aspirations.

Looking back, I believe much clearer steps should have been taken over the past year to implement the charter. Progress has not been as swift as it should have been. Worse, the Charter is repeatedly being questioned, which is unfortunate. Every political party was involved in the process, including those now in power, those in opposition and those outside parliament. All of them are stakeholders.

Above all, I will keep repeating what I have said before: the July National Charter is printed in black ink, but every word of it is written in drops of blood.

Daily Waadaa: You spoke about the aspirations of the Uprising. To many people, that may sound like political rhetoric. You also said progress has not been as swift as it should have been. Could you explain why?

Professor Ali Riaz: During the second phase of discussions, many political parties repeatedly emphasised the need to bring the process to a conclusion as quickly as possible. The National Consensus Commission also shared that view, and both the commission and the political parties made every effort to expedite the process.

We did not want to squander this opportunity for state reform. That was why discussions on the implementation process during the third phase of the commission’s work were not prolonged. Everyone believed that implementation should begin as quickly as possible. Constitutional arrangements had to be put in place, the centralisation of power had to be stopped, constitutional institutions had to be made independent, and citizens’ rights had to be protected.

If the sense of urgency that existed then is no longer felt by those in power, I believe that, in effect, they are moving away from the fundamental spirit of the July Uprising and the national charter that emerged from it.

Waadaa: You have said it is unfortunate that the charter is being questioned. Some people from the government camp have even described it as a document of 'endless deception'. What is your response?

Professor Ali Riaz: Where was the deception? Everything discussed was incorporated into the charter. Everything discussed during the preparation of the July Charter was broadcast on national television, with all parties present, throughout the process. The parties reached agreements, and points of dissent were also included in the document.

All the participating parties signed the charter. Four political parties declined to sign it. On October 17 last year, 24 political parties signed the document, and two more signed it subsequently.

The process was therefore conducted transparently.

The allegations of deception might have been justified if we had made promises and then failed to honour them. But the National Consensus Commission had no authority to make or implement such promises. Our responsibility was to build consensus among political parties on the basis of the reports of six reform commissions.

We identified 166 issues. During the first phase of discussions, the parties could not agree on many of them, so those issues were excluded. In the second phase, we discussed 20 issues and introduced substantial amendments and changes.

Political parties were involved at every step. To suddenly describe the outcome as deception is therefore a questionable claim. You were part of that process, in which we did not make promises ourselves. We simply prepared a document through discussions with everyone.

Waadaa: But now, with little progress in implementation, another section of people believes that you have left everything to the future, creating the present impasse. In other words, did you fail to use the opportunity to make implementation legally binding?

Professor Ali Riaz: First, the National Consensus Commission could not implement anything itself. That was the responsibility of the executive branch.

Could the executive branch—the interim government at the time—have implemented the reforms? That question could have been, and indeed was, raised: whether the interim government had the authority to implement constitutional changes.

Amid that debate, the July Charter was divided into two parts. One covered constitutional matters, while the other covered reforms that could be introduced through laws and other legal instruments.

The interim government implemented many of the reforms that could be carried out through laws, rules and regulations. However, some important state-reform ordinances issued for that purpose have since been repealed, including the ordinance concerning judicial independence.

The interim government did what it could. Any attempt to go beyond those limits would have raised questions about its authority.

The second point is that political parties entered into a pact with the people. They are therefore responsible for implementing it.

During the interim period, the government held discussions, reflected the people's aspirations for state reform through a participatory process, prepared a document and established a roadmap. It then handed that roadmap to the political parties.

Political parties are supposed to govern the country and give effect to the aspirations of the people. If they fail to do so, how can the interim government be held responsible?

Waadaa: But are political parties, particularly the government, properly taking responsibility? Are they not avoiding the process?

Professor Ali Riaz: Let us consider what avoiding the process means.

All political parties were involved in the process for more than nine months. In fact, the process had begun more than a year earlier, as the constitutional reform commission and the electoral reform commission, among others, sought the views of political parties. Public opinion was also sought, and the National Consensus Commission subsequently engaged directly with the political parties.

The charter was prepared over nine months on the basis of that process.

If you examine the entire process, you will see that it went beyond the framework of the existing Constitution. Consider the interim government itself. There is no provision for an interim government in the existing Constitution. Yet political parties accepted that government, conducted politics under it, participated in its initiatives and contested an election held under its arrangements. They called on people to vote in the referendum that was part of those arrangements.

Can it be said that the process was not proper?

Those who have reservations, they had enough time to raise such objections. Let me give you an example. On November 13, 2025, the July National Charter Implementation Order was issued, providing for a referendum. A referendum ordinance was subsequently promulgated, clearly setting out what would happen.

The election was then held on February 12. There were  nearly 90 days to object. They could have said that they are opposed to  the arrangements or participate in the political process until the order was withdrawn. Did any political party do that?

Some parties criticised the process, and that is fine. Criticism is part of politics. But criticism and rejection are two different things.

No political party declared the National Consensus Commission's process unacceptable or rejected it. None withdrew from participation or objected to the decision-making process. Nor did any party reject the interim government's implementation order or the referendum order.

Instead, they urged people to participate in the referendum and called on them to vote 'Yes'.

Waadaa: But the government is now invoking constitutional rules and procedures. It is arguing that the Constitution has no provision for a Constitution Reform Council, which was part of the July National Charter Implementation Order issued by the interim government. What do you say?

Professor Ali Riaz: If the Constitution does not provide for a Constitution Reform Council, it also does not provide for an election in 2026. Nor does it provide for an interim government. Does that mean one should ask: how did you contest an election under that interim government?

This issue also arose during the National Consensus Commission's discussions on implementation. At the time, we discussed how the government stood in an intermediate position, somewhere between the constitutional framework and arrangements outside it.

The interim government was formed following the Supreme Court's opinion under Article 106 of the Constitution. But can you establish a government today simply by invoking Article 106? You can not.

Why was it possible on August 8 but not on July 6? Because a major event occurred in between: the mass uprising succeeded.

If you acknowledge the uprising, you must also acknowledge that the country was no longer operating entirely within the existing constitutional framework. The legitimacy, effectiveness and foundation of the interim arrangements rested on the uprising.

Can we say that we were outside the constitutional framework on the day of the uprising but returned to it entirely the following day?

The 30 political parties that took part with us did so in circumstances that contravened Articles 7A and 7B of the Constitution. So, political parties participated in discussions outside the constitutional framework, considered reforms outside that framework, prepared a document outside it and held a referendum outside it. But suddenly, on election day evening, you decide that you must return to the Constitution in its entirety. That is simply not consistent.

Waadaa: Are you saying, then, that the election was not held entirely in accordance with the Constitution?

Professor Ali Riaz: If you strictly follow the Constitution, how do you hold an election in 2026? Where was the provision for the 90-day period before the election? Where was the prime minister under whose authority the election was supposed to be held?

Now, all of a sudden, Article 106 is being invoked. Where did that come from?

Was Article 106 invoked before the 2014 election, the 2018 election or the 2024 election? No. It was invoked after a successful mass uprising.

Around 1,400 people gave their lives, and 15,000 were injured. Countless mothers lost their children. Can we suddenly fit that sacrifice into the narrow confines of a white book of the Constitution?

Did people gave their lives in accordance with that Constitution? Where does the Constitution say that a prime minister can use state forces in such a manner to carry out mass killings?

Waadaa: But the BNP says it wants to amend the Constitution in accordance with constitutional procedures. It has even formed a constitutional amendment committee. What is wrong with that?

Professor Ali Riaz: When you speak of amendment, you are referring to relatively limited changes. Article 142 of the Constitution sets certain limits on the scope of these amendments, and those limits cannot be crossed.

If you attempt fundamental structural changes within the framework of an amendment, those changes may be challenged in court because parliament does not have the authority to alter the Constitution's basic structure.

This is essentially the distinction between constituent power and amending power. An elected parliament has the power to amend the Constitution, but it does not have the power to change its fundamental structure. Such structural changes can only be made by exercising constituent power.

We saw a violation of this principle in the case of the Fifteenth Amendment.

Drawing on that experience, and recognising that we were proposing structural changes, we argued that a special authority, constituent power, was necessary.

For example, introducing a bicameral parliament with a proportional-representation-based upper house or setting term limits for the prime minister would involve fundamental structural changes. A conventional parliament does not have the authority to make such changes.

That is why we proposed granting this special authority to a Constitution Reform Council.

Political parties underscored the need to give the 13th Parliament certain additional powers. But how could those powers be conferred? That was why we went to the people.

In the referendum, we proposed that the body be called an interim Constitution Reform Council and that its mandate be limited. It could not continue indefinitely, so we proposed a period of 180 working days.

The fundamental difference between reform and amendment is whether you want to change the structure of the state or preserve the existing constitutional framework through relatively minor changes.

Waadaa: BNP leaders, including those at the highest level, have said they will implement the July Charter to the letter. What is your response?

Professor Ali Riaz: The July National Charter effectively became a popular mandate through the implementation order and the referendum.

Therefore, if it is to be implemented, what the people voted for and what the political parties agreed to must be carried out.

If you genuinely want to establish a democratic state, you must implement the people's verdict.

Waadaa: But the Constitution Reform Council was never formed. Is there still an opportunity to return to that framework?

Professor Ali Riaz: In politics, if you remain committed to the fundamental spirit of an agreement and genuinely want to implement it, you always can find a way. Where there is a will, there is a way.

Everyone entered into this pact (July Charter) to find a solution. It was not an agreement between the people and only the current ruling party. Those currently in opposition and those outside parliament also entered into this (agreement).

Waadaa: Bangladesh has a poor record of fulfilling promises on state reform. Many people believe the aspirations of 1971 remained unfulfilled despite the enormous loss of life and sacrifice. Others point to the Three-Alliance Framework of 1990. In other words, political parties have failed to keep their promises after coming to power. How do you view this

Professor Ali Riaz: Those who judge the July National Charter and the 1990 Three-Alliance Framework by the same standards are making a serious mistake.

Have you seen a signed document setting out the Three-Alliance Framework? Who signed it? What process was followed? Who participated? Did the people know about it? They did not.

We do not know where, when or how the agreement was reached or what discussions led to it.

The July National Charter is different in several respects.

First, it emerged from a successful and unprecedented mass uprising.

Second, it was prepared through a transparent process involving all stakeholders.

Third, public opinion was sought. The Constitutional Reform Commission alone collected the views of more than 100,000 people.

Finally, public consent was obtained through a referendum.

Comparing the July National Charter with the 1990 agreement is therefore an attempt to create unnecessary confusion.

Waadaa: So, do you remain optimistic?

Professor Ali Riaz: I am optimistic because an agenda has now been established for the structural changes the people of Bangladesh want and for building an accountable system of governance. A roadmap for those changes has also been developed.

People now understand what kind of changes they want. I am confident that the July National Charter will continue to serve as a guiding framework for transforming Bangladesh's state structure in the future.

Waadaa: Thank you very much for your time. 

Professor Ali Riaz: Thank you too.

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