Bangladesh's post-July uprising politics increasingly resembles a house divided against itself.
The alliance that brought down the Awami League has splintered into competing camps, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizen Party (NCP) now contesting both in elections and in claiming the ‘ownership’ of the July uprising's political legacy.
Their disagreements over constitutional reform and the implementation of the July Charter have grown steadily sharper. Public exchanges have become more acrimonious. Social media amplifies every disagreement, often leaving the impression that the coalition forged in the streets has dissolved altogether.
Yet beneath the rivalry lies a more enduring political reality. The strongest common denominator among the parties that emerged from the July uprising remains their shared opposition to the Awami League and the political system associated with its years in power.
They may increasingly disagree over what should replace that order, but they continue to agree that a simple restoration of the old one is neither politically desirable nor, in the eyes of many of their supporters, morally acceptable.
That underlying consensus surfaced again during what would otherwise have been an ordinary press briefing last week.
After a ceremony at the Secretariat honouring police personnel, Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed was asked by a reporter about law-enforcement preparations ahead of June 23, the anniversary of the Awami League. Before answering, he interrupted, "Please ask again," he said.
The reporter immediately realised that he had referred to the Awami League without describing it as a ‘banned’ organisation. He repeated the question, this time adding the qualifier. Salahuddin smiled faintly before replying, "Now it is alright."
The exchange lasted less than a minute. It nevertheless became one of the most widely circulated political videos in Bangladesh over the following day. It was not merely the enthusiasm of BNP supporters, figures from rival political camps, including those who have frequently criticised Salahuddin and the BNP, publicly welcomed the intervention.
The following day, the Home Minister reinforced that message, saying he no longer regarded the Awami League as a conventional political party but as a "mafia group" and reiterating that its activities remained banned under the current legal framework.
The remarks acquired significance because they arrived amid months of speculation about whether the BNP, now in power, might eventually soften its position towards the Awami League. That speculation has become one of the defining themes of Bangladesh's post-election political debate.
The roots of that debate lie in the country's rapidly changing political scenario. For much of the past three decades Bangladesh revolved around an entrenched rivalry between the BNP and the Awami League. Jamaat was an important electoral ally of the BNP but remained a junior partner.
The emergence of the NCP following the July uprising, together with Jamaat's stronger electoral performance, has complicated that familiar landscape. Competition is no longer confined to two dominant parties. Instead, the BNP now finds itself challenged by parties that share many of its anti-Awami League credentials while offering different visions for institutional reform and political renewal.
That transformation has inevitably generated friction. The BNP has been criticised by sections of the Jamaat-NCP bloc for moving too cautiously on constitutional reforms and for allowing elements of the July Charter agenda to lose momentum after entering government.
In turn, BNP leaders have defended a more incremental approach, arguing that governing demands compromise and institutional continuity rather than permanent revolutionary politics.
Against that backdrop, a different narrative has gathered momentum. Videos showing small Awami League processions, reports of bail being granted to some of its leaders and activists, and a visible increase in online campaigning by Awami League supporters have all fuelled speculation that the party is attempting to rebuild its political presence.
Supporters of the opposition bloc have interpreted these developments differently. Some argue that they reflect ordinary legal processes and fragmented attempts at political organisation. Others have suggested that they indicate a broader opening in the political environment.
Political commentators have gone further, speculating that a weakened Awami League might eventually serve the BNP's strategic interests by dividing the opposition space occupied by Jamaat and the NCP.
Such arguments rest on a familiar logic of competitive politics: a diminished historical rival may appear less threatening than an ascendant new competitor. The BNP's deteriorating relationship with Jamaat has lent these interpretations additional plausibility.
Yet that reading may underestimate how profoundly the July uprising altered the political incentives of all the principal actors.
The BNP's strategic repositioning is real. As several analysts have observed, the party has spent recent years moving away from its earlier dependence on centre-right coalition politics and towards a broader claim to occupy the political centre.
Such repositioning broadens its electoral appeal beyond traditional constituencies and allows it to present itself as a national governing party rather than simply the principal anti-Awami League force.
But occupying the political centre does not necessarily imply accommodating the Awami League. Indeed, the opposite argument can be made. The BNP's claim to political legitimacy after July rests substantially on its longstanding opposition to what it characterises as years of increasingly authoritarian rule under the Awami League.
A rapid political rehabilitation of its principal historical rival would complicate that narrative and blur the distinction on which much of the BNP's electoral identity now depends.
Nor has the Awami League's own political position become any less complicated. Although some of its leaders have been released through judicial processes and supporters have become more visible in digital spaces, the party continues to face profound political and legal challenges.
Critics argue that it has yet to undertake any meaningful public reckoning with allegations of political repression, enforced disappearances, restrictions on civil liberties and the conduct of state institutions during its final years in power.
Supporters reject many of those accusations or argue that they have been selectively presented. Regardless of where those debates ultimately lead, the absence of a broadly accepted process of political accountability continues to shape perceptions across much of the post-July political spectrum.
Salahuddin Ahmed's own position illustrates how quickly perceptions can shift in such an environment. As a senior BNP leader who survived enforced disappearance before spending years in exile in Shillong, India, he has periodically been the subject of political speculation.
Some critics questioned whether his long stay in India, where several senior Awami League figures, including Sheikh Hasina, are also now located, implied a softer approach towards the former governing party. Those suggestions were political interpretations rather than established facts.
His recent remarks, however, have been widely read as reinforcing the BNP leadership's continued insistence that the Awami League remains fundamentally different from an ordinary political competitor.
Whether that position endures will ultimately depend less on rhetoric than on policy. Bangladesh's political history offers numerous examples of tactical realignments and unexpected accommodations. No political configuration should be assumed permanent.
Equally, however, it would be premature to conclude that growing rivalry between the BNP and the Jamaat-NCP bloc has displaced the deeper consensus forged during the July uprising.
That consensus was never built on ideological uniformity. The parties and activists who converged during the movement represented different political traditions, competing constituencies and contrasting visions of the state. What united them was a shared conviction that the existing political order had become unsustainable.
Now that they compete for power, those differences have inevitably resurfaced. Yet the political memory of July continues to shape the limits of that competition.
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Faisal Mahmud is the Managing Editor of Daily Waadaa