The country's post-July 2024 revolutionary political order is yet to take a clear shape. The general elections and a referendum were held, as promised, but the elected political actors are still debating how and when to implement the reforms they had broadly agreed upon. Meanwhile, the fallen political forces are also attempting to stage a comeback.

The ongoing political transition from Sheikh Hasina's style of authoritarian governance to a democratic culture based on the rule of law is still far from complete. Are we, then, waiting for the completion of the current transition or another shift in the nation's political journey? The more important question is not when the next transition will occur, but what lessons have been learned from the one that unfolded two years ago.

The political changeover of 5 August 2024 was not only unforeseen by most dominant political actors but also an extraordinary development in the country's political history. As a result, there was little preparedness for redefining the political architecture and steering the transition towards institutionalising democracy by eliminating the residual effects of the anti-people, mafia-style rule.

In fact, the July-August student-mass uprising broke with the established pattern of political change observed over the previous eight decades.

Bangladesh has experienced every major political shift roughly every two decades. It emerged as an independent country in 1971 through the dismemberment of Pakistan, just 24 years after Pakistan was created as a Muslim state in 1947. Nearly two decades later, in 1990, a student-led mass uprising overthrew an autocratic regime.

The Westminster system of parliamentary democracy, restored in 1991, was suspended for two years following the military-backed takeover on 11 January 2007. The abolition of the polls-time caretaker government system through a constitutional amendment in 2011 effectively closed the door to free and fair elections. Sheikh Hasina remained in power by holding three widely disputed elections in 2014, 2018 and 2024 before fleeing to India on 5 August 2024.

In between, there were political disruptions and course corrections. The post-independence rule of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was marked by growing authoritarianism and the dismantling of democracy through the introduction of the one-party BAKSAL system in 1975.

His rule ended with his assassination in a military coup on 15 August that year. President General Ziaur Rahman, who restored multi-party democracy and founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), was also assassinated in a military coup on 30 May 1981.

General HM Ershad seized power from the elected BNP President Justice Abdus Sattar on 24 March 1982 and ruled through coercive means. BNP Chairperson Khaleda Zia won the 1991 parliamentary elections but was compelled to relinquish power in 1996 after incorporating the caretaker government system into the Constitution in the face of violent protests led by Sheikh Hasina's Awami League. Hasina, in turn, lost to Khaleda Zia in the 2001 elections.

In the recent debates between the BNP, the winner of the 2026 elections, and Jamaat-e-Islami and the National Citizens' Party, now the opposition in the Jatiya Sangsad, some frustrated observers see an opportunity for the revival of the Awami League. What they overlook is that the rejection of the secularist politics championed by Hasina's Awami League signifies a broader paradigm shift towards the centre-right.

The 2026 elections confirmed the emergence of a new political mainstream and the marginalisation of the now-banned Awami League, historically a centre-left party. Before Hasina's one-and-a-half decades of authoritarian rule, the BNP, a centre-right party, and the Awami League together commanded the support of around 80 per cent of voters in reasonably competitive elections.

However, pre-election surveys in 2026 suggested that nearly 80 per cent of voters had shifted to the anti-Awami League bloc dominated by the BNP and Jamaat.

At one point, Sheikh Hasina emerged as arguably the country's most dominant political figure by systematically suppressing the opposition. The people, however, paid the highest price for ending that rule, with more than 1,500 men, women and children killed and around 30,000 injured during the July-August 2024 movement.

It was the most consequential political transformation in Bangladesh's history. Students and ordinary citizens rose against an authoritarian system without the leadership of any political party or individual, unlike the revolutions in Russia in 1917, China in 1949 and Iran in 1979. Yet no revolutionary government emerged after 5 August 2024.

Instead, Muhammad Yunus's interim administration succeeded in forging a political compromise around a reform agenda. As the pre-election political consensus and the aspirations embodied in the July Charter have increasingly become subjects of political rhetoric and controversy, the 2024 revolution remains unfinished.

It is also unclear whether the main contenders for power are able to read the aspirations of the silent majority, particularly younger voters, and envision both their own and the country's political future accordingly.

The memory of the revolution remains vivid, and many of them took part in the victory processions on 5 August 2024. If their aspirations continue to go unmet, they may once again take the initiative to shape another political transition. The choice still rests with the politicians.

Khawaza Main Uddin is a journalist. He can be reached at khawaza@gmail.com.