Geographic determinism is a comforting doctrine for big powers surrounded by smaller neighbours. For ages, foreign policy in New Delhi rested on a simple premise that Bangladesh, wrapped almost entirely within India’s embrace, had nowhere else to go. 

That comfortable illusion collapsed alongside Sheikh Hasina’s government in August 2024. Yet, six months into the tenure of Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, Indian diplomacy appears intent on recycling its old playbooks. 

Facing a transformed political landscape in Dhaka, South Block is offering minor concessions and legalistic assurances while testing whether calibrated pressure can restore the cozy hierarchy of the past. It is a dangerous and costly miscalculation.

Consider the recent attempt to defuse a toxic issue in bilateral relations…the continued presence of Sheikh Hasina on Indian soil. New Delhi has assured a parliamentary committee that while Bangladesh’s ousted autocrat was granted refuge on humanitarian grounds, she will not be permitted to use Indian territory for political activities against her homeland. 

Yet this distinction strikes readers in Dhaka as absurdly thin. Only weeks earlier, Hasina granted a lengthy telephone interview to Reuters from her Indian sanctuary, opining on the future of her party and promising a 'grand return' to Bangladesh. 

Indian officials may insist that answering a telephone call from a reporter does not constitute organized political activity. In Dhaka’s charged atmosphere, however, such ‘semantic acrobatics’ serve only to deepen suspicion that New Delhi remains attached to its former ‘client.’

The Hasina problem is merely symptomatic of a broader failure to comprehend how fundamentally Bangladesh has changed. The political order created by the Awami League over fifteen years vanished overnight. 

In its place sits a new administration in Dhaka, buoyed by a commanding parliamentary mandate following the February elections, which views foreign relations through a starkly pragmatic lens. Under Tarique Rahman and his foreign minister, Khalilur Rahman, Bangladesh is embracing a doctrine of unvarnished multi-alignment. 

The foundational premise of this strategy is simple…maintaining good relations with one capital must not come at the expense of relations with another. Foreign policy is no longer viewed as an exclusive zero-sum contest between regional titans.

The symbolism of Tarique’s early diplomatic itinerary was a testament to that. Instead of making the traditional ‘pilgrimage’ to New Delhi—long considered an obligatory first port of call for freshly minted Bangladeshi leaders—the prime minister turned his gaze elsewhere. 

In June, he travelled first to Malaysia for bilateral discussions with Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, receiving full state honours, before proceeding to Beijing. The trip to China yielded a suite of agreements spanning infrastructure, investment, trade, and strategic cooperation. 

Western and Indian commentators were quick to suspect a sharp pivot toward Beijing. Yet that interpretation misunderstands Dhaka’s intention. Bangladesh is not trading an Indian sphere of influence for a Chinese one. Rather, it is replacing structural dependence with strategic optionality.

New Delhi’s awkward response to this shift was on display in the recent skirmish over diplomatic invitations. Indian media trumpeted an invitation extended to Tarique Rahman to attend the upcoming BRICS summit in India. Yet it was revealed by Daily Waadaa that the gesture was extended to him not as an elected head of government for a crucial bilateral summit, but in his capacity as the current rotating chair of BIMSTEC, an India-led regional group. 

The contrast with the treatment meted out to Hasina could hardly be starker. In 2023, she was whisked to New Delhi for the G20 summit as a special guest, despite Bangladesh not being a member. To Bangladeshi observers, the message is insulting and clear. That India remains comfortable bestowing high honours on individuals, but treats the democratic state of Bangladesh with bureaucratic aloofness.

This institutional blind spot is the direct legacy of India’s previous policy. For over a decade, New Delhi enjoyed unprecedented strategic gains under Hasina. Border sanctuaries for insurgents targeting India’s northeast were liquidated, transit corridors were expanded, and cross-border trade flourished. 

Yet by tying its regional interests so explicitly to one ruler rather than to the country itself, India incurred an enormous toxic debt among the Bangladeshi public. When Hasina fled, New Delhi inherited the bitter resentment meant for her regime.

Instead of making a clean break, Indian policy has drifted into half-measures. Visa services for ordinary Bangladeshis remain severely restricted, citing security concerns, despite warnings from India’s own parliamentary panel that such policies are destroying goodwill. Earlier, New Delhi withdrew transshipment facilities for Bangladeshi exporters, citing port congestion—a move widely interpreted in Dhaka as an economic warning shot. 

These petty squeezes reflect a lingering belief in Indian policy circles that geography grants them an insurmountable upper hand.

Geography remains immutable, but options are dynamic. China can provide massive infrastructure financing, deep-water ports, and military hardware. Southeast Asia offers expanding markets for trade and labour exports. The Gulf provides crucial capital and energy supplies, while Washington and Tokyo remain deeply engaged in Bay of Bengal security and development. 

None of these actors can fully replace India’s physical proximity, its contribution in Bangladesh’s liberation war, shared cultural history, or transit connections. Taken together, however, they significantly lower the price for Dhaka to say ‘no’ to New Delhi.

There are signs that some in India recognize the peril. The parliamentary standing committee on external affairs has called for normalising visa operations, renewing the vital 1996 Ganges Water Treaty, and rebuilding ties with Dhaka’s new government. These are sensible steps. But piecemeal recommendations will accomplish little unless New Delhi abandons its paternalistic instincts.

If Tarique Rahman eventually travels to India merely as the leader of a regional sub-committee, while South Block continues to hedge its bets and harbour the ghosts of the past, Dhaka will draw its logical conclusions. 

India still holds formidable natural geographic and economic advantages in Bangladesh that no distant superpower can easily duplicate. Yet proximity becomes a liability when it generates diplomatic complacency. If South Block continues to mistake physical presence for permanent political leverage, it will soon discover that its 'most consequential neighbour' has quietly moved on without looking back.

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Faisal Mahmud is the Managing Editor of Daily Waadaa