On October 14, a family in Brahmanbaria received a telephone call from Saudi Arabia. Nazrul Islam, who had travelled to the kingdom to work as a cleaner, had been executed. Three days earlier, Nazrul had spoken to his parents from prison. The conversation lasted about two and a half minutes. He had been calling home every Sunday during his detention. Nothing in that final conversation suggested his execution was imminent.
Nazrul arrived in Saudi Arabia on November 10, 2022. His father, Abdul Basir, who had himself worked in the kingdom for 24 years, borrowed six lakh taka from relatives to finance the journey. According to the family, Nazrul worked as a cleaner at the Grand Mosque in Makkah.
He was arrested on August 1, 2023. Another Bangladeshi cleaner, Sweety Akhtar, was detained the following day. Both were subsequently sentenced to death.
The Saudi authorities described their offences in broad terms. Nazrul was detained under the kingdom's cybercrime law, while Sweety faced an allegation of adultery. The Saudi Interior Ministry announced that a competent court had imposed death sentences under ta'zir, a category of discretionary punishment under Islamic law. The verdicts had been upheld and a Royal Order issued authorising the executions.
The ministry did not publicly explain the precise conduct underlying the convictions.
Nazrul's mother, Rahima Begum, disputes the allegations against her son. His aunt, Abeda Begum, collapsed after learning of his death and died early the following morning. His father still owes much of the money borrowed to send Nazrul abroad. He has asked that his son's body be returned so the family can see him one last time.
A confidential memorandum sent by the Bangladesh Consulate General in Jeddah to the expatriates' welfare ministry on October 18 indicates that Bangladeshi diplomats were unaware that either prisoner faced execution.
On September 30, Saudi authorities provided the consulate with a list of approximately 2,500 Bangladeshi prisoners. Nazrul and Sweety appeared on it, their offences identified as information technology-related and adultery. Neither entry mentioned a death sentence.
Two weeks later, both were dead.
The memorandum states that neither the Bangladesh Embassy nor the consulate received official or unofficial notification of the sentences or executions. The mission could not establish whether the prisoners had legal representation or interpreters of their choosing.
It also recorded that neither family had approached the mission for assistance.
These gaps leave important questions unanswered: when were the death sentences imposed, what evidence was presented, what opportunities did the defendants have to appeal, and why were Bangladeshi authorities not informed?
Bangladesh's diplomatic response has concentrated on obtaining information while preserving relations with Saudi Arabia. Foreign Secretary (East and West) Md Nazrul Islam met Saudi Ambassador Abdullah Zafer bin Abiyah to seek details. Officials clarified that the ambassador had not been formally summoned.
State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humaiun Kobir described the executions as "very disappointing" but emphasised Saudi Arabia's importance as a friendly country. He expressed hope that bilateral relations would continue to strengthen.
Another state minister, Shama Obaed Islam, said Bangladesh was still awaiting a copy of the court verdict.
Officials from both countries stressed the importance of Bangladeshis observing the laws of their host country. Compliance with local law is an obligation for migrant workers. It does not, however, settle the separate question of whether those accused of offences received adequate legal safeguards.
The Jeddah memorandum suggests that Bangladesh's diplomatic mission lacked information necessary to intervene before the sentences were carried out. An official's explanation that missions cannot follow up on every prisoner illustrates the limits of consular protection for a large migrant population.
Saudi Arabia remains one of Bangladesh's most important overseas employment destinations. The livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshi families depend on work in the kingdom, giving Dhaka substantial economic and diplomatic interests in maintaining the relationship.
Those interests help explain the government's caution. They do not answer why the families learned of the executions only after they had taken place. The cases also belong to a wider pattern of Saudi Arabia's increasing use of capital punishment.
Saudi authorities executed 356 people in 2025, according to figures cited by human rights organisations, the highest annual total recorded in the kingdom. Of those, 243 were executed for drug-related offences.
Research compiled by Reprieve and the European Saudi Organisation for Human Rights found that foreign nationals accounted for an unusually large share of those executed, including many convicted of non-lethal drug offences. For the first time in a calendar year, the number of foreigners executed exceeded the number of Saudi citizens.
Rights organisations have also challenged executions involving offences allegedly committed by defendants when they were minors. The execution of Jalal al-Labbad prompted renewed criticism of Saudi Arabia's compliance with international obligations concerning juvenile offenders.
Saudi Arabia is a party to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which prohibits capital punishment for offences committed by people under 18. The government maintains that its judicial system operates under Islamic law and that capital sentences pass through judicial review before implementation.
Human rights organisations dispute whether those procedures consistently provide defendants, particularly foreigners, with adequate legal representation, interpretation and opportunities to challenge evidence.
The treatment of members of the Saudi royal family has long attracted scrutiny, particularly when allegations involve conduct prohibited under the kingdom's laws.
On November 25, 2025, Prince Abdullah bin Fahad bin Abdullah bin Abdulaziz bin Jalawi Al Saud, 29, was found dead in a bathroom at the London Marriott Hotel Kensington.
At an inquest in July 2026, a coroner concluded that he had died by misadventure following cardiac arrest caused by a combination of alcohol and GHB. His blood alcohol concentration was recorded at 222 milligrams per 100 millilitres, almost three times Britain's drink-driving limit. Traces of cannabis and Xanax were also detected.
The prince had previously undergone treatment for dependence on alcohol, benzodiazepines and pregabalin at the Priory Clinic in Roehampton.
Saudi Arabia prohibits alcohol, and consumption can carry criminal penalties. Yet the prince's death occurred in Britain, where different laws applied. The circumstances therefore cannot establish that he received preferential treatment from a Saudi court.
They nevertheless illustrate a difference in the circumstances of wealthy members of the ruling family and migrant workers whose conduct is subject to Saudi criminal law.
Other royal cases have produced more direct legal controversies.
In 2015, Prince Majed Abdulaziz Al-Saud was arrested in Los Angeles following allegations of sexual assault and unlawful confinement. Police investigated complaints involving several women, including an account of a woman attempting to escape the prince's residence.
He was released on $300,000 bail. Prosecutors subsequently declined to pursue a felony charge, citing insufficient evidence. The allegations did not result in a felony conviction.
A different case ended in conviction. In 2010, a British jury found Prince Saud bin Abdulaziz bin Nasir al Saud guilty of murdering his servant, Bandar Abdulaziz, in a London hotel.
The trial included evidence of prolonged physical and sexual abuse. The prince received a life sentence and was later transferred to Saudi Arabia to serve the remainder of his punishment.
These cases involved different offences and legal outcomes. They cannot, by themselves, demonstrate a uniform exemption from punishment for Saudi royalty. They do, however, invite scrutiny of how power and access to legal protection affect the consequences individuals face.
The most consequential case involving Saudi state power remains the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi. In October 2018, Saudi operatives killed Khashoggi inside the kingdom's consulate in Istanbul. His body was dismembered.
A US intelligence assessment released in February 2021 concluded that Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had approved an operation to capture or kill the journalist. The Saudi government rejected allegations that the crown prince ordered the murder.
Saudi authorities prosecuted several individuals over the killing. Death sentences imposed on some defendants were later commuted. The proceedings attracted international criticism over their secrecy and failure to establish accountability at senior levels.
The US intelligence assessment and the Saudi government's denial remain central to the dispute over responsibility. For Khashoggi's family and advocates, the case also became a test of whether governments prepared to condemn the murder would impose lasting consequences on Saudi Arabia's leadership.
On November 18, 2025, Mohammed bin Salman arrived at the White House for a visit marked by a red carpet, Saudi and American flags and a mounted honour guard.
President Donald Trump welcomed the crown prince despite continuing questions about Khashoggi's murder. When ABC News correspondent Mary Bruce raised the killing and concerns expressed by families of victims of the September 11 attacks, Trump objected to the question.
"Things happen," the president said, adding that the crown prince knew nothing about the murder. Trump described Mohammed bin Salman as a longstanding friend. The reception reflected the strategic and commercial importance Washington attaches to Riyadh. Six months earlier, the White House had announced a $142 billion defence cooperation package with Saudi Arabia, describing it as its largest such agreement.
The Trump family's commercial interests in Saudi-linked real estate projects have also raised questions about the relationship between private business and foreign policy.
The administration has presented its relationship with Saudi Arabia as essential to regional security, defence cooperation and investment.
Those objectives are not new. Successive American administrations have maintained close ties with Riyadh despite disagreements over human rights, regional military operations and political repression. The Khashoggi case briefly threatened that relationship. It did not fundamentally alter it.
Britain has followed a comparable course.
When Prime Minister Keir Starmer visited Riyadh in December 2024, Downing Street said the two leaders had discussed Mohammed bin Salman's human rights reforms under Vision 2030.
Trade and security were also prominent. Saudi Arabia was Britain's largest defence export market, with annual sales valued at approximately £3.8 billion, while the wider bilateral trading relationship was worth around £17 billion. Human rights organisations urged Starmer to challenge the kingdom's rising execution figures.
As opposition leader, Starmer had criticised former Prime Minister Boris Johnson for going "cap in hand from dictator to dictator" in pursuit of energy supplies.
In government, he faced the same competing demands of commercial interests, regional security and human rights commitments. Starmer returned to Saudi Arabia in April 2026 for discussions involving the US-Iran ceasefire and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.
Prince William had also visited Riyadh earlier in the year at the British government's request, with economic cooperation among the objectives. These visits demonstrate the extent to which Saudi Arabia has become embedded in Western economic and security calculations.
Arms contracts, energy markets, investment flows and regional diplomacy all give Washington and London reasons to maintain access to the Saudi leadership. Human rights concerns remain part of their official statements, but they have not prevented high-level visits or major commercial agreements.
There is a difference between maintaining diplomatic relations with a government and endorsing its judicial practices. Western governments argue that engagement can serve security interests while providing opportunities to raise human rights concerns.
The effectiveness of that approach is open to examination against Saudi Arabia's execution figures and the limited public accountability surrounding controversial cases.
The immediate questions for Bangladesh however are more specific. Two citizens were executed without their diplomatic representatives receiving advance notice, according to the Jeddah consulate's memorandum. Their families were not informed that death sentences had been imposed. The available record does not establish whether they received adequate legal assistance or interpretation.
Dhaka has requested the court documents but has publicly placed considerable emphasis on preserving bilateral relations. The government has legitimate reasons to protect the employment opportunities and welfare of Bangladeshis living in Saudi Arabia. Consular protection, however, is part of that responsibility.
A full account would require access to the judgments, information about legal representation, the appeal proceedings and an explanation for the absence of notification.
It would also require clarification of the arrangements under which Bangladesh is informed when its citizens face capital charges abroad.
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Zulkernain Saer is an investigative journalist