Bangladesh did not emerge from the political upheavals of 1975 with a settled understanding of what had happened. Five decades later, even the terminology remains contested. Was August 15 a military coup? Was November 7 a revolution, a counter-coup or a soldiers’ uprising? And which of these events fundamentally altered the country's political direction?
The definitions matter. They concern more than the legitimacy of individual leaders. They concern the nature of political power, the relationship between the military and the state, and the competing ideas of Bangladesh that emerged after independence. November 7, 1975, deserves particular attention because it changed all three.
The uprising brought Major General Ziaur Rahman back into the military leadership after his detention, challenged the revolutionary ambitions of the left and began a process of restoring command within an army fractured by factional struggles.
It also helped establish the political foundations of a different understanding of Bangladeshi nationalism. To understand why, one must begin with August 15.
The assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on August 15, 1975, is generally described as a military coup. The description captures the participation of military officers but leaves out an important political dimension.
The men who overthrew Mujib did not establish a conventional military government. Power passed to Khondaker Mostaq Ahmad, a senior politician from Mujib's own Awami League. This makes August 15 more complicated than a straightforward military takeover.
It involved serving and former military officers, but its immediate political beneficiary came from within the ruling party. The transfer of power therefore combined military intervention with an internal political realignment. One interpretation is that August 15 represented a factional rupture within the Awami League, carried out with the participation of military officers.
On November 3, Major General Khaled Mosharraf launched another coup. Ziaur Rahman, then the army chief, was placed under house arrest. The military leadership was divided and competing factions claimed authority. Officers increasingly faced threats from within their own ranks. The killing of four national leaders inside Dhaka Central Jail on November 3 further exposed the breakdown of state authority.
Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmad, M Mansur Ali and AHM Qamaruzzaman were murdered while in custody. The killings took place during the political upheaval surrounding Khaled Mosharraf's coup. Questions about responsibility and the relationship between the killings and the competing military factions remain important to any serious examination of that period.
Khaled Mosharraf's intervention was presented in terms of restoring military discipline. Yet it was itself another seizure of power outside the established constitutional process. That contradiction defined the crisis. Every faction claimed to be restoring order. Each intervention further weakened the institutions through which order was supposed to be maintained.
The army was no longer simply divided over leadership. It was divided over the legitimacy of its own command structure.
The crisis created an opening for the revolutionary left.
JASAD, the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal, had developed an underground military organisation known as the Biplobi Sainik Sangstha, or Revolutionary Soldiers' Organisation. Associated with Colonel Abu Taher, the organisation sought to mobilise ordinary soldiers against the established officer hierarchy.
Its political project was fundamentally different from that of the conventional military leadership. Where senior officers sought to control the chain of command, JASAD's revolutionary organisation sought to reorganise the relationship between officers and soldiers.
The slogan attributed to the movement was revealing: "Subedars and havildars are brothers. There are no officers above them." An army depends on a recognised command structure. Soldiers may have legitimate grievances against their superiors, but replacing institutional command with competing political loyalties creates a different kind of military organisation.
That was the central risk posed by the Revolutionary Soldiers' Organisation.
During the November upheaval, several military officers were killed. The violence exposed the danger of revolutionary mobilisation within an already divided armed force.
For JASAD's revolutionary faction, the moment offered an opportunity to transform the military and, through it, the state. For those who believed that Bangladesh needed a functioning national army, the same developments represented a threat to institutional survival.
There was also a wider security dimension. A plot to abduct Indian High Commissioner Samar Sen, involving individuals associated with JASAD's revolutionary network, illustrated the risks created by the period's militant politics. Anwar Hossain, Colonel Taher's brother, was linked to the episode. He later became a university professor and vice-chancellor of Jahangirnagar University.
The implications of such a plot extended beyond domestic politics. The abduction of a foreign high commissioner could have triggered a major diplomatic confrontation with India. In the circumstances of 1975, it might also have created pressure for a more direct Indian response.
It is impossible to establish what India would have done. But the potential consequences for Bangladesh's sovereignty were substantial. The episode demonstrated how internal political struggles could expose a newly independent country to external risks.
On November 7, soldiers rose against the military leadership that had emerged from Khaled Mosharraf's coup. Ziaur Rahman was released from detention. The event became known as the Sepoy–Janata Biplob, or Soldiers–People's Revolution, reflecting the participation of soldiers and sections of the civilian population.
Zia did not emerge into a stable political environment. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and four senior national leaders had been murdered in prison. The army had experienced successive coups. Officers had been killed, and the established military hierarchy had been challenged by revolutionary organisations.
The immediate problem was institutional. Bangladesh needed a functioning chain of command. Without it, the armed forces could not operate as a coherent institution, and the state would remain vulnerable to further interventions by competing factions.
Zia's response was to reassert military authority and gradually consolidate control. His leadership, military experience and standing among sections of the armed forces helped him navigate the crisis.
So, the political significance of November 7 extended beyond the restoration of military command. Ziaur Rahman eventually developed a conception of nationalism that differed from the political framework associated with the Awami League after independence. His emphasis on Bangladeshi nationalism placed greater weight on territorial identity, sovereignty and a political community defined by citizenship rather than primarily by linguistic and cultural heritage.
Bangladesh had emerged from a liberation struggle in which Bengali nationalism played a central role. Zia's political project sought to give the independent state a broader national identity, one that could incorporate different cultural and religious traditions within the country's territorial boundaries. This was also a political response to the ideological conflicts of the 1970s.
Zia moved away from the revolutionary socialist aspirations of JASAD and from the Awami League's earlier model of concentrated political authority. The political system that developed under him placed greater emphasis on nationalism, private enterprise, religious identity and a multiparty framework.
It became the foundation of Bangladesh's nationalist centre-right.
That transformation did not occur on November 7 itself. It developed over subsequent years through changes in political institutions, constitutional principles and party organisation. But November 7 created the conditions in which it became possible.
The soldiers who freed Zia did not necessarily share a single political programme. Nor can the uprising be reduced to a unified popular endorsement of the political order that later emerged. Its historical importance lies in its consequences.
It prevented the revolutionary faction associated with JASAD from becoming the dominant force within the military. It restored Zia to a position from which he could consolidate authority. And it opened the way for a new political formation that would reshape Bangladesh's national debate.
That formation would eventually become institutionalised through the Bangladesh Nationalist Party.
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Dr Asaduzzaman Ripon is a Vice Chairman of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and a member of the party's National Executive Committee