An ace up her sleeve, and chaos up her street Waadaa Collage
Opinion

Bluffing from exile

Bangladesh’s deposed prime minister vows a December comeback, testing whether the current government has learned the hard lessons of its own history

Mohammad Nakibur Rahman

Bangladesh has seen this performance before. Announce a deadline. Promise a political earthquake. Hint at a secret trump card. Then wait for the country to confuse political theatre with political momentum.

In 2004, Abdul Jalil, then general secretary of the Awami League, declared that Khaleda Zia’s BNP-led government would fall by April 30. He spoke of a mysterious trump card capable of bringing down the administration. The country waited. The deadline approached and the card never appeared.

Jalil eventually asked for more time. Sheikh Hasina, then opposition leader, had already provided an escape clause: if the government did not fall by this April 30, it would fall by another. The promise became a political embarrassment. But the circumstances surrounding it deserve more attention than the failed prediction itself.

Speculation centred on defections from the BNP. The theory was that enough disgruntled lawmakers could be persuaded to abandon Khaleda’s government and undermine its parliamentary majority. Whether this was Jalil’s intended trump card remains unproven. What is beyond dispute is that the BNP was experiencing internal dissent.

In 2004, former BNP lawmakers Mahi B Chowdhury and Abdul Mannan joined Badruddoza Chowdhury’s new political formation. Two years later, the rupture became considerably larger. In October 2006, 102 BNP leaders, including 13 sitting lawmakers, broke away to form the Liberal Democratic Party under Badruddoza Chowdhury and Oli Ahmed.

The defections did not vindicate Jalil’s deadline. They demonstrated the vulnerabilities that opposition parties can exploit when a governing party fails to manage its internal divisions. The Awami League, in my assessment, had placed considerable hope in disgruntled BNP figures, particularly those uncomfortable with the party’s alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami. That is a political interpretation, not evidence of a coordinated clandestine operation.

But the difference does not diminish the warning. A governing party can survive an opposition ultimatum. It may find it harder to survive the erosion of trust within its own ranks.  

October 28, 2006, provided another warning. Violence erupted in Paltan between Awami League and Jamaat-e-Islami supporters, with Jamaat activists subjected to brutal attacks. The failure of the security establishment to prevent the bloodshed remains an indictment of the authorities responsible for public order.

Lutfuzzaman Babar, then state minister for home affairs, and the police leadership had a duty to protect citizens regardless of political affiliation. Their failure deserves scrutiny. Babar subsequently endured years of imprisonment and prosecution under Awami League rule. That history does not absolve him of responsibility for events during his own tenure.

Political accountability cannot depend on whether yesterday’s official has become today’s victim. Two decades later, Bangladesh faces another deadline, another promise and another attempt to manufacture political inevitability.

Hasina, now in India following her overthrow in August 2024, has spoken of returning to Bangladesh in December. Her declared intention has attracted international attention, including coverage by the Associated Press. But an intention is not a strategy. A deadline is not a mandate. And a former prime minister’s determination to return is no evidence that the country wishes to restore her to power.

Hasina’s departure followed an uprising whose human cost cannot be wished away. The UN Human Rights Office estimated that as many as 1,400 people may have been killed during the July-August 2024 crackdown. She has since been convicted in absentia over crimes associated with that repression.

Any discussion of the Awami League’s political rehabilitation must begin with this record. It cannot begin with the convenience of restoring a familiar party to the electoral landscape. Yet that is precisely where Bangladesh’s present political debate risks drifting.

The problem is not merely Hasina’s messaging from exile. It is the possibility that people operating within the political establishment may help rehabilitate the Awami League before the party has meaningfully confronted its past. 

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s adviser Zahed Ur Rahman, whose responsibilities include information and broadcasting, and Rashed Khan, who has assumed a political role in the prime minister’s office, should face scrutiny over how their public positions and decisions affect this debate. Such scrutiny is not an allegation of clandestine collaboration. It is a demand for political clarity.

A government elected after an uprising against authoritarian rule must explain how it distinguishes legitimate pluralism from the rehabilitation of an organisation associated with systematic repression.

The same question applies to television commentators such as Anis Alamgir, Nahid Aktar, Mahbub Aziz and Panna. Their right to participate in public debate is not in question. Nor should disagreement with a party ban automatically make someone an Awami League sympathiser.

But arguments for political inclusion cannot be insulated from questions about accountability. Those advocating the party’s return should explain what conditions, if any, must precede it. Otherwise, repetition can achieve what political argument cannot. A once-discredited proposition gradually acquires the appearance of respectability simply because it is discussed often enough.

This is where BNP’s calculations become particularly important.

The party should remember what happened when hostility towards Jamaat within its broader political orbit became entangled with internal dissent in the years preceding 2007. The lesson is not that BNP must preserve every alliance indefinitely, or that Jamaat and its student organisation, Shibir, should escape scrutiny. Both should be judged by their conduct.

It is that selective political indulgence carries costs.

If Jamaat and Shibir supporters face punitive treatment while advocates of the Awami League’s rehabilitation receive a more accommodating reception, the government must be prepared to explain the distinction. Political consistency is not a luxury for an administration seeking to consolidate democratic legitimacy. It is a condition of that legitimacy.

There is an international dimension, too.

Awami League sympathisers have sought audiences in Washington, including among conservative figures whose politics overlap with Hindu nationalist advocacy and hardline positions on Islam and the Middle East.

Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, is one prominent voice in that ideological environment. The organisation, founded by Daniel Pipes, has faced criticism from Muslim civil-rights organisations and groups monitoring anti-Muslim prejudice. Such associations deserve examination. They do not, by themselves, establish a coordinated effort to restore Hasina.

Nor should Bangladesh exaggerate the influence of American political connections.

The Democratic gains in the 2026 midterm elections have changed the congressional landscape, although they do not automatically determine the Trump administration’s foreign policy. Those who imagined that access to sympathetic Republicans could provide a durable route to political restoration should reconsider.

A conference in Washington cannot confer democratic legitimacy in Dhaka. A former diplomat cannot deliver an electorate. And renting a venue associated with the United Nations does not amount to UN endorsement. International advocacy may influence perceptions. It cannot substitute for accountability at home.

That leaves Tarique Rahman with a choice.

His government can maintain a principled distinction between protecting democratic rights and facilitating political rehabilitation without accountability. It can confront the legacy of the Awami League while ensuring that its own security and political decisions remain consistent with the rule of law.

Or it can allow factional calculations, selective hostility and institutional ambiguity to erode that distinction. The latter would be a familiar mistake.

Hasina’s December declaration may prove no more consequential than Jalil’s April 30 ultimatum. Political deadlines are easy to announce and difficult to honour. But the real lesson of 2004 is not that the trump card failed. It is that the political weaknesses surrounding that episode did not disappear with the deadline.

By 2006, the BNP was confronting defections, escalating confrontation and a crisis that would culminate in the military-backed emergency of January 2007.

History will not necessarily repeat that sequence. The circumstances are different, as are the political actors and the scale of the upheaval that preceded the present government. Yet one principle survives the comparison.

Opposition parties do not always need a winning trump card. Sometimes they need only a governing party willing to play its own cards badly.

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Dr Mohammad Nakibur Rahman teaches finance at an American University

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