Thomas Kean
Thomas KeanPhoto: Courtesy

‘ICJ ruling could deliver justice but complicate Rohingya return’: ICG expert

Thomas Kean says an ICJ ruling against Myanmar could affect prospects for Rohingya repatriation and draw further scrutiny of the Trump administration’s engagement with the military government
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Washington’s renewed engagement with Myanmar’s military government could strengthen the junta without securing meaningful concessions on human rights or helping resolve the country’s political crisis, Thomas Kean, senior consultant on Myanmar and Bangladesh at the International Crisis Group, has warned.

The Trump administration’s interest in Myanmar is driven partly by the need to tackle scam centres that cost Americans billions of dollars and to gain access to the country’s rich reserves of critical minerals, much of which currently goes to China.

But Kean said the US strategy risks putting its own interests ahead of peace and human rights. He also warned that the Rohingya crisis appears to have been pushed aside, as the group is not even mentioned in Washington’s country strategy for Myanmar.

In an interview with Daily Waadaa, Kean also discussed the implications of the International Court of Justice’s upcoming judgment in the genocide case against Myanmar. 

He said the ruling could have far-reaching consequences, including for the Rohingya’s prospects of returning home, and could shape Washington’s approach to the country.

Daily Waadaa: What do you make of the US re-engaging with Myanmar’s military, the Tatmadaw? Why do you think Washington is doing this now? The US has also shown interest in issues such as scam centres and rare-earth minerals. What could this renewed engagement mean for Myanmar itself? Could it influence the course of the conflict or the country's political future? or its just a transactional US administration following its own interest?  

Thomas Kean: Washington had been signalling for some time that it was moving towards re-engaging Nay Pyi Taw. Shortly after Trump returned to power, the administration initiated a review of its Myanmar policy and had been gradually increasing contact with Nay Pyi Taw on issues such as immigration and trade. 

But even under President Biden there had been some quiet talks with the military regime both within Myanmar and around the region. 

Clearly under Trump the normative reasons for isolating the regime – its human rights abuses, its corruption and its detention of Myanmar’s elected leaders – no longer have much weight. 

But there were also some compelling national interest justifications for expanding dialogue, particularly the proliferation of scam centres along the Thai-Myanmar border. The State Department estimates that Southeast Asian scam centres cost Americans at least US$12.5 billion in 2025 alone. 

Myanmar is also rich in critical minerals that are essential for weapons manufacturing, AI data centres and the green transition, but at the moment these are mostly exported to China. So re-engagement is the logical outcome of having a transactional US administration in the White House. 

But just because it is transactional, we should not dismiss its ability to shape the conflict. Despite its much diminished standing in the world, the United States remains an influential actor, particularly in Asia. The question therefore is less whether US re-engagement will impact Myanmar than what impact it will have.  

DW: How do you think Myanmar’s other conflict actors – particularly the Arakan Army and the resistance groups – will view Washington’s renewed engagement with the military? Could this create further mistrust or complicate efforts to find a political solution?

TK: I think at this stage there is a combination of skepticism and trepidation from ethnic armed groups and post-coup resistance forces. The State Department’s recently released Integrated Country Strategy for Burma sets some bold targets, including a “lasting peace agreement” by 2030, but gives few details on how the US plans to achieve that in a country that has been at war with itself since independence in 1948, and where the military has shown almost no interest in making the concessions needed to end internal conflicts. 

The strategy also explicitly links this peace agenda to creating an enabling environment for US investment in Myanmar, and in particular delivering access to the country’s rare earth reserves. The link between peace and investment is likely to only amplify doubts about Washington’s commitment to promoting “peace, stability, and human rights in Burma”, as the strategy claims. The risk is that the US pushes opposition groups into hasty ceasefire deals that give Nay Pyi Taw the upper hand but do little to address the grievances underpinning the conflicts. 

The other important point is that Washington needs to go into this process clear-eyed about what Nay Pyi Taw will be willing and able to deliver. Most of Myanmar’s prized rare earths are in an area of the country controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation, which is one of the country’s most powerful ethnic armed groups and has stepped up clashes with the military since the coup. 

The mines are adjacent to the Chinese border and are run by Chinese firms. It therefore seems very far-fetched that Nay Pyi Taw could deliver the US access to concentrates from those mines. 

Meanwhile, the scam centres along the Thai border are in territory controlled by armed groups that are either formally part of the Myanmar military or have maintained ceasefires with it. 

The military relies on these groups to counter the Karen National Union, another powerful ethnic armed group – they are an integral part of its conflict management strategy. If it cuts off their revenues from the illicit economy, it risks losing their support, which it can ill afford. This is a structural feature of Myanmar’s civil war and further underscores that the conflict cannot be resolved by poorly considered ceasefires.     

DW: Does Washington risk legitimising Myanmar’s military-backed authorities without securing any meaningful concessions on human rights or the political crisis? What could this mean for the wider region, particularly Thailand, China, India and Bangladesh? Could other countries reconsider their own approach to Myanmar?

TK: The risk of an approach focused exclusively on US national interests is that these are pursued at the cost of the concessions that the military needs to make to move the crisis closer to a political solution. There’s nothing wrong with engagement per se, but intervening in a way that strengthens Min Aung Hlaing’s hand with either ethnic armed groups or the post-coup resistance so that he doesn’t have to engage in serious negotiations is not going to help the country move out of the current crisis. 

It’s important to remember that it was the military that plunged the country into this crisis and, while most people inside Myanmar want to see an end to the fighting, Min Aung Hlaing’s administration has very little domestic legitimacy. 

The “election” his regime orchestrated in December 2025 and January 2026 was no better than Hasina’s sham poll in January 2024: there was no real opposition and turnout was low, even by official figures.

Unlike in 2011, when Thein Sein came to power, there’s been no change of course from the coup leader since he became president. You may have read that Aung San Suu Kyi was recently allowed to receive two books from King Charles III. The fact this was seen as some sort of concession from Nay Pyi Taw shows just how dire the country’s political crisis is – in some ways worse than under the military regime that ruled from 1988 to 2011. 

Where Min Aung Hlaing has been successful is in securing international recognition for his administration. Since becoming president he has already visited India, China, Russia and Belarus, along with five of the 10 other ASEAN member states, including countries like Malaysia that were previously very critical of Nay Pyi Taw; trips to Indonesia and Brunei are also expected in the coming months.

This speaks to a changing world in which democracy and human rights no longer matter in bilateral relations the way they once did. US re-engagement may accelerate this trend, including by normalising diplomatic contact between other Western governments and Nay Pyi Taw.

DW: For Bangladesh, the biggest concern remains the Rohingya crisis. Could this renewed US engagement help create conditions for repatriation, or is there a risk that the issue will take a back seat to Washington’s other priorities?

TK: Bangladesh should be wary of this transactional engagement. More than perhaps any other country in the region, it understands the consequences of diplomatic solutions that put expediency above human rights. 

While Rohingya returned to northern Rakhine following the refugee crises of the late 1970s and early 1990s, they were never granted the rights to which they were entitled, and the 2016-17 influx was a direct consequence of that failure. 

As Prime Minister Tarique Rahman said on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September, Bangladesh’s goal is for the Rohingya to “return to their homes in Myanmar safely, voluntarily, with dignity and with their rights protected”. The prime minister deserves praise for taking a principled position – one that also recognises the fact that hasty solutions are not going to ultimately be in Bangladesh’s best interests.

Unfortunately, the Rohingya were not even mentioned in the US country strategy, so it is hard to conclude that repatriation is a priority for the US government. 

That said, US actions could have implications for Bangladesh. The first step to creating conditions for repatriation would be a durable ceasefire between the Arakan Army and the Myanmar military. 

If the US contributes to bringing about a ceasefire that brings peace and stability, then it would at least create one of the necessary conditions for repatriation – even if there would still be much work to do to make returns possible, such as resolving the citizenship status of Rohingya and rebuilding trust between the Rohingya and Rakhine communities. 

What we have seen so far from the Myanmar military though is continued offensives and an unwillingness to countenance a ceasefire that recognises the reality of its diminished position in Rakhine State. Bangladesh should make clear to the US that any peace initiatives it undertakes in Myanmar must put the future of Rohingya front and centre.   

DW: The Arakan Army now controls most of Rakhine State. How much influence does Myanmar’s military-backed government actually have over the situation there? Can Washington achieve anything on the Rohingya issue by dealing primarily with the authorities in Naypyitaw? Should it also engage directly with the Arakan Army?

TK: If Washington is serious about peace in Myanmar, it has to engage all sides to the conflict and that includes the Arakan Army. The group is perhaps the most significant player in the current conflict: among all the forces actively fighting the military, it has the largest armed wing and has achieved the most significant territorial gains. 

It also occupies a strategic location between India and Bangladesh, and the state is home to major Chinese investment projects. Despite the military committing significant resources to its recent counter-offensives in Rakhine, it has so far made little progress, which is testament to the resilience of the Arakan Army. But beyond the fighting in Rakhine, the Arakan Army is also an important supporter of resistance forces in central Myanmar and has troops stationed in many other parts of the country, including Kachin, Shan and Karen states. The decisions that it makes – including on whether to continue fighting or to pursue a ceasefire – will shape the conflict as much as any intervention by Washington.

DW: The Democrats have won control of both chambers of the US Congress in the November midterm elections. Could this affect Trump's Myanmar policy? Might the new Congress put pressure on the administration over its engagement with the military, particularly on human rights and democracy, or is Myanmar unlikely to become a major issue in US domestic politics?

TK: Congress has less scope to influence foreign policy than domestic affairs, so we should be realistic about what a Democratic-controlled Congress will mean for Myanmar policy. This is particularly the case given that Myanmar is not a pressing issue in the US and most of the members of Congress who once took the lead on Myanmar are no longer active. It’s simply not going to be a high priority. 

That said, Myanmar is something of a bipartisan issue in Congress, and there has already been some pushback to the White House’s approach even before Washington stepped up engagement in September. Back in March, a bipartisan group of four House representatives wrote to Secretary of State Marco Rubio with input for the policy review, warning against engaging the military regime and urging the State Department to spend funds appropriated by Congress for supporting opposition groups and addressing humanitarian needs. 

I’d expect that with a Democratic majority, Congress will push even harder for transparency on the White House approach, including the outcome of its policy review and details of its engagement with Nay Pyi Taw. Another focus might be the work of lobbying firm DCI, which Min Aung Hlaing’s administration has hired to advocate for engagement and the lifting of sanctions. 

DW: The International Court of Justice is scheduled to deliver its judgment in The Gambia's genocide case against Myanmar on November 19. How significant could this judgment be for the Rohingya crisis? Could it influence Washington's engagement with Myanmar or change the calculations of other regional powers? What should Bangladesh expect from this development?

TK: Regardless of the outcome, the judgment will have major implications both within Myanmar and around the world. The court will rule on whether Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention, either by failing to prevent and punish genocide, or by committing genocide, when the Myanmar military carried out “clearance operations” against the Rohingya in 2016-17. The case has been brought against the state rather than individuals, which is instead the domain of the International Criminal Court. 

A ruling that Myanmar committed genocide would make it the first state the court has found directly responsible for genocide; to date, the only country found to have failed to prevent genocide was Serbia in 2007. 

Any ruling against Myanmar would inevitably provoke a furious reaction from Nay Pyi Taw. Even though the opposition National Unity Government has dropped its objections to the case, a finding against Myanmar would also put it in an awkward position, given Aung San Suu Kyi’s nominal leadership of the body. 

There is also a risk that a judgment against Myanmar will amplify anti-Rohingya sentiment among the broader population, and this would likely further dim prospects for repatriation or any improvement of conditions for Rohingya who remain in Myanmar.

This is not an argument against accountability; it is simply recognition of the generally toxic attitudes within Myanmar towards the Rohingya. The ICJ ruling will test whether those attitudes have shifted at all since the coup.

A genocide ruling may amplify Congressional pushback to Washington’s engagement with Nay Pyi Taw but is unlikely to have any effect on the White House. In fact, the broader implications of a ruling against Myanmar mean it may have the opposite effect. The ruling will shape several other genocide cases, including South Africa v Israel. 

This is why the US ambassador to the UN, Mike Waltz, publicly waded into the debate last month, claiming on X that The Gambia’s judge ad hoc in the Myanmar case, Nobel laureate Navi Pillay, was trying to “lower the legal threshold for proving genocide so that weakened and false standard can later be weaponized against American and allied soldiers whenever they raise a finger against terrorists that hide behind civilians”. 

This was a clear reference to the case against Israel. He then warned that Washington would be “watching the ICJ’s handling of these proceedings very closely”, and intimated that the US might even impose sanctions against it – just as it has done with the ICC. It was a stark declaration of how far international diplomacy has shifted under this Trump administration. 

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