Did politics trump evidence in the Hasanul Huq Inu trial?

The International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) convicted Hasanul Huq Inu, the President of the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), a member of parliament and a former minister under the Awami League government, on three charges of crimes against humanity. 

It acquitted him on five others and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment on each of the three convictions, to run concurrently.

Section 20 (2A) of The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 requires the judges to make their full written judgement available on the same day they deliver their judgement in court.

Two weeks on, however, they have failed to do so. In the absence of the full written judgement, some caution is warranted before drawing definitive conclusions.

However, having followed the trial, reviewed the witness testimony, and examined other significant prosecution evidence—including recorded telephone conversations and television interviews given by Inu himself—and heard the summary judgment given in court, some preliminary conclusions can already be drawn about both the acquittals and the convictions.

The acquittals

The five acquittals should prompt serious scrutiny of the original decisions by both ICT prosecutors and ICT judges to have allowed these charges to proceed to trial at all: specifically, the decision by prosecutors to include these allegations in their formal charge application, and the subsequent decision by the Tribunal to agree to frame the charges. 

This is because it was clear at a very early stage that the evidential foundation of these charges against Inu was either extremely weak or entirely non-existent, and they did not, arguably, meet the evidentiary thresholds required before the Tribunal may lawfully prosecute.

Crimes against humanity are among the most serious offences known to law. They are also among the most legally complex, and the decision to frame charges against an individual should never be taken lightly. 

It requires proper consideration of three distinct questions: the legal elements of the offence; the specific conduct alleged against the accused; and the actual evidence said to support each charge.

Under the Bangladesh ICT Rules of Procedure, a charge must pass several distinct evidentiary tests before the Tribunal may frame it.

First, before including a charge against a person in its “Formal Charge”, the prosecutor must be satisfied that a "prima facie" case exists (Rule 19). This is widely understood to mean that there is enough evidence on each element of the offence that, if left unrebutted, a reasonable tribunal could convict.

Second, once the prosecution has presented its evidence to the Tribunal, the judges must themselves be satisfied that it discloses a prima facie case (Rule 29), at which point the Tribunal takes "cognisance."

Third, after hearing arguments from both prosecution and defence, the Tribunal can frame charges if they are of the view that there is "sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence" (Rules 37 and 38). 

This mirrors the language used in section 265D of Bangladesh’s Code of Criminal Procedure, and is generally understood to require an evidential threshold similar to that of a prima facie test.

Yet, when one looks at the charges that resulted in acquittals, it is difficult to see how the prosecutors or judges could conclude that there was sufficient evidence to proceed with charge framing.

For example, charge number 1 alleges that, by publicly characterising the protesters as "BNP," "terrorists," "Jamaat," and "Communal elements" in a television interview on Mirror Now, he "intentionally incited, abetted, and facilitated the killing of unarmed student protesters throughout Bangladesh."

While Inu does use this language to describe the protesters, there is no precedent in international criminal law for such language alone to form the basis of a crimes against humanity prosecution. 

Moreover, the relevant interview, broadcast on 18 July, shows no intention of inciting, abetting, or otherwise facilitating "the killings of unarmed protestors," as alleged. Indeed, he clearly states that he wants talks to "gradually defuse the situation," adding that since the students' proposal and the government and court position are almost the same, “there is no point of losing life and confrontational politics." 

Where, then, is the evidence in the interview of inciting, abetting, or otherwise facilitating the killings?

And charge 2 alleges that on the evening of July 19, Inu was present at a meeting chaired by Sheikh Hasina which “jointly decided and resolved to suppress the ongoing student-public movement by using the most extreme measures”, including the imposition of curfew throughout the country and the issuance of a “shoot-at-sight” order, resulting in 1,400 deaths.

The prosecution, however, had no evidence of what was said or agreed at that meeting. The only evidence it produced was a newspaper report stating that Hasina “held a meeting with the senior leaders of the 14-party alliance"—a description of attendance, not of any decision reached. 

Without any evidence of what was said, agreed, or decided at the meeting, how could Inu be charged with this offence? In addition, of course, imposing a curfew is a lawful governmental decision, and it indeed resulted in reduced killings, not more.

And charge 4 alleges that the telephone conversation between Inu and the prime minister on 20 July shows “he conspired, planned and instigated the commission of murder through the use of lethal weapons, aerial bombings and armed assaults” to suppress the nationwide student-public movement against discrimination.

There is nothing in that conversation that supports such an allegation. There is no mention of lethal weapons or armed assaults. The only reference to "bombings" is immediately clarified by Inu himself to mean "sound bombs"—and there is no evidence that any other form of bombing was deployed by the government during this period. 

So what is the basis of this charge?

Why were charges framed?

The question, then, is why did ICT prosecutors apply to bring these charges against Inu, and why the Tribunal agreed to frame them?

As for the prosecutors, the evidence points toward a failure of professional independence: rather than rigorously scrutinising the law and the evidence on its merits, the prosecution appears to have allowed partisan considerations, supported by external social pressures, to drive its decisions. 

Inu was openly critical of aspects of the protests and consistently maintained that the BNP and Jamaat—whom he sometimes characterised as terrorists or militants—were orchestrating them. 

He had also been a longstanding political ally of Sheikh Hasina. Given the fundamental absence of evidence supporting most of these charges, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these associations, rather than any sound evidentiary foundation, were the operative reasons for his prosecution.

As for the judges, there must be questions about whether, at the stages of both cognisance and charge-framing, they conducted proper scrutiny of the charges, considered the necessary legal tests constituting the offence, and the evidence provided by the prosecution. 

Whilst the charge-framing order delivered by the judges on November 2, 2025 was far more detailed than many comparable orders from these tribunals, the judges nonetheless failed to go through each charge in turn and set out the evidence relied on in determining that there was a prima facie case. 

Had they done so, they would have realised that the evidence was absent.

The convictions

We turn now to the three charges on which Inu was convicted. The evidence supporting these is also very weak, and it is very difficult to see how conviction was warranted.

Charge number 3 alleges that Inu committed murder as a crime against humanity by "ordering" the Superintendent of Police in Kushtia to arrest, detain, torture, and kill protesting students and civilians, resulting in six deaths.

Now it is true that Inu had a conversation with the Superintendent of Police on July 20 and that six people were killed on August 5, but there is no evidence that Inu’s conversation can be linked to the killings, which were notably 15 days apart. The only evidence of what passed between Inu and the SP derives from remarks Inu himself made to Sheikh Hasina in a separately recorded conversation on July 20. 

In that exchange, he speaks of compiling a list of "those on the ground who led the march," notes that the Superintendent of Police is "already compiling the list of the men by looking at photos on the computer," and says he told him to "pick these boys up by tonight." 

There is no mention of killing or injuring any protester—only of detaining them. Since this is a charge of murder, it is difficult to understand how this conversation can support the allegation. The Kushtia SP was notably absent as a witness. The prosecution did not present any other evidence to support the charge.

The second charge on which Inu was convicted was number 6, which alleged that by approving and endorsing the plan to ban Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, Inu incited, instigated, and assisted the commission of large-scale killings, torture, and persecution, thereby committing crimes against humanity.

This charge lacks any discernible legal coherence. Support for the administrative banning of a political party—however objectionable that position may be on political grounds—cannot rationally constitute a crime against humanity. Such a claim extends far beyond any recognised application of the offence. 

The banning of a political party is, as with curfews mentioned above, a lawful exercise of governmental authority, even where it is politically contested.

And finally, charge number 7 concerns a second recorded conversation between Hasina and Inu on August 4, which the prosecution relies upon to claim that Inu conspired to incite murder, persecution, torture, and other inhumane acts. There is nothing in the conversation that sustains that claim. 

Throughout, Inu's focus is on detaining protesters rather than on any of the acts (murder, persecution, torture etc) alleged.

Indeed, in direct reference to the introduction of a new curfew, Inu explicitly says there should be "no shooting". He says: "My point is that the curfew should mean that as soon as someone leaves the house, they will be arrested. There will be no shooting, but that is between you and me, no shooting—but the Army's attitude should be like that: strict, meaning absolutely strict." 

He repeats the same instruction: "I suggest that the curfew should be very strict in its body language—that as soon as someone leaves the house, they will be arrested. Not 'shot,' but 'arrested' will surface—meaning on TV: 'Thirty people arrested from Shantiniketan, sent to jail.' But we won't send them to jail, we'll keep them at the police station, and release them after ten hours. You understand, right?"

These passages demonstrate that the conversation did not incite murder, persecution, torture, and other inhumane acts as claimed.

Arbitrary detention as crime against humanity

There is, however, a striking omission amongst the charges.

What is notable is that the prosecution did not charge Inu with the one offence for which a prima facie evidential case could plausibly have been made: that is, aiding and abetting, or instigating, imprisonment as a crime against humanity. 

In the two intercepted conversations with Hasina, Inu talks about having told the Kushtia SP to arrest protest leaders and also actively encourages Hasina to use arbitrary arrest and detention. Such a clear admission, on the one hand, and encouragement on the other, could possibly have formed the basis of a criminal charge. 

However, the ICT investigation agency did not undertake any investigation into this possible charge, and the prosecutors failed to present it to the judges.

Why did the prosecution not pursue it?

The most plausible explanation is that prosecutors considered that such an allegation relating only to arbitrary imprisonment was an insufficiently serious offence and were determined to charge Inu with what they regarded as graver conduct. In doing so, however, they seriously overreached—with the consequence they have made Inu the victim of a miscarriage of justice.

The judges' summary judgement

On 30 June, the judges read out excerpts of their full written judgement, focusing on the two intercepted conversations between Sheikh Hasina and Hasanul Huq Inu. In doing so, the judges did not state with any clarity how their interpretation of the conversations connected to any specific offence.

For example, the judges stated: "Particularly significant in this portion, wherein the accused discussed the preparation of lists of persons allegedly leading processions in Uttara, Badda, Gulshan, Jatrabari, and other locations. 

He stated that local authorities were examining photographs, identifying the individuals, and preparing lists, and further stated that he had instructed that such persons be picked up during the night. 

He expressly recommends that similar measures be adopted in Dhaka and proposes that persons identified as organizers or leaders of demonstrations be taken into custody so that no further procession would take place."

This may well be an accurate account of what Inu said, but, as noted above, he was not prosecuted for his involvement in imprisonment as a crime against humanity. The judges' emphasis on this material therefore sits oddly with the charges actually before them.

The judges also stated that one of the conversations "reveals an individual who was actively participating in discussion concerning the suppression of the ongoing uprising. The deployment of the state power, the maintenance of coercive pressure upon demonstrators, the mobilization of political cadres, and the formation of strategies to neutralize the opposition activities."

There may be some truth in this characterisation, but seeking to impede or suppress large opposition protests is not, in itself, a crime against humanity. What matters is the manner in which suppression is carried out. 

While it is clear that at least some Awami League politicians supported the use of lethal force against protesters, nothing in what Inu said or did in these conversations suggests that he was among them.

The judges placed particular weight on Inu's remark to Hasina that "I think the decision was very correct," stating: "Such endorsement assumes legal significance because it occurs in the context of decisions concerning measures [that] already resulted in casualties and mass arrest. The Tribunal therefore finds that the conversation contains substantial evidence from which abetment may reasonably be inferred." 

But this comment appears at the very beginning of the 20 July conversation, with no context establishing what "the decision" actually refers to. The far more plausible reading is that Inu was referring to the decision, taken the day before, to impose a curfew enforced by the army—a lawful measure that in fact coincided with a reduction in killings, not an increase. 

There is no evidence that Inu meant he supported decisions resulting in "mass casualties," and the judges offer none to support that inference.

In conclusion

Taken together, the acquittals, the convictions, and the reasoning offered in the summary judgement point to the same underlying failure: decisions have been made without the evidence base needed to justify prosecutions for offences as serious as these. 

The claim that can arguably be made is that at each stage—charge framing, prosecution, and now judgement—decision-makers reasoned backward from a presumption of Inu's guilt rather than forward from the evidence actually before them.

Conversations capable of supporting, at most, a charge of arbitrary detention have been stretched to sustain convictions for murder as a crime against humanity; language expressing hostility to protesters has been read as incitement to kill them; and a lawful curfew and the banning of a political party have been recast as evidence of a plan to kill. 

None of this is to minimise the gravity of what took place in July and August 2024, nor to suggest that Inu bears no responsibility for his own conduct during that period—indeed his role in supporting arbitrary detentions is arguably culpable. 

But the ICT's purpose is to deliver justice according to law, which requires independent consideration of the evidence before it, of the factual and legal precedents within international criminal law, and of the complex legal tests that must be satisfied to prove the offence of crimes against humanity, and not to allocate blame according to political affiliation. 

On the evidence, the Tribunal has failed in that task, and Hasanul Huq Inu's conviction should be understood as what it is: a miscarriage of justice.

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David Bergman is a journalist. He divides his time between London and Dhaka