Two Bangladeshis executed in Saudi Arabia. Where was their government?

On October 14, Saudi Arabia executed two Bangladeshi nationals, Nazerul Islam Abdul Basir and Siti Akhtar, in the Mecca region. According to a statement attributed to the Saudi Interior Ministry, they had engaged in unspecified “immoral acts” inside a mosque, violating its sanctity.

The statement did not identify the mosque. It did not explain what the alleged acts involved. Nor did it establish whether the two were married. The public record, however, leaves a more consequential question unanswered. What role did Bangladesh play while two of its citizens were facing the death penalty abroad?

An official at the Bangladesh Consulate in Jeddah told The Daily Star that Saudi authorities had not informed the mission before carrying out the executions. After learning of the incident, the consulate reportedly sent a diplomatic note seeking formal confirmation.

If that account is accurate, Bangladesh learned of the deaths only after the sentences had been carried out.

This matters. Consular intervention after an execution may establish facts and facilitate communication with families. Intervention during a criminal proceeding can help ensure access to legal representation and procedural safeguards.

In a country where millions of citizens are working, the apparent absence of timely notification is a serious diplomatic concern.

It also points to a larger problem. Bangladesh has built an extensive economic relationship with Saudi Arabia through labour migration and remittances as well as religious travel surrounding Hajj and Umrah. Yet the protection of individual migrant workers remains a less visible measure of that relationship's success.

A death sentence that was a choice

One detail in the reported Saudi statement deserves particular attention. The sentences were imposed under ta'zir, rather than hadd.

In Islamic jurisprudence, hadd refers to punishments prescribed for certain offences, while ta'zir covers penalties determined through judicial or state discretion. It means the authorities had discretion over the sentence. They imposed death.

That decision raises questions about proportionality, particularly because the precise conduct underlying the convictions has not been publicly explained. A court's ability to impose capital punishment makes procedural safeguards especially important. The punishment is irreversible, and errors cannot be corrected after it has been carried out.

Yet the publicly available account provides little information about the evidence, the defendants' lawyers, their understanding of the proceedings or the reasoning behind the sentences.

A Bangladeshi student at King Abdulaziz University, described as having worked as an interpreter during the case, reportedly provided additional details. According to his account, a Pakistani national recorded the alleged incident on a mobile phone, and the recording circulated among others. The person who made the video was reportedly sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The student also described the two defendants crying during the hearing. He said he could see that the man was young but could not estimate the woman's age because she wore a niqab. These details have not been independently verified. They should therefore be treated as allegations rather than established facts.

Nevertheless, they point out some questions that Bangladesh should be asking.

Did the defendants have qualified legal representation? Were they provided with professional interpreters? Did they understand the charges and the consequences of their pleas or testimony? Were they able to challenge the evidence and pursue meaningful appeals?

And did either defendant request assistance from the Bangladesh Consulate?

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations establishes procedures through which detained foreign nationals may communicate with their consulates. Its provisions are intended to prevent foreign citizens from becoming isolated within unfamiliar legal systems.

Consular access does not guarantee acquittal. Nor does it allow a foreign government to override another country's judicial process. But it can help ensure that defendants understand their rights, communicate with their families and obtain appropriate legal assistance.

Saudi Arabia's increasing use of capital punishment makes these safeguards particularly significant. According to AFP, the kingdom executed 356 people in 2025, setting a record for the second consecutive year. Human rights organisations have raised concerns about the growing number of foreign nationals among those executed.

Foreign workers can face additional disadvantages because of language barriers, limited financial resources and unfamiliarity with local legal procedures. The question is not whether Bangladeshis should be subject to Saudi law. They are, like other foreign residents.

The question is whether Bangladesh has done enough to ensure that its citizens receive meaningful assistance when their lives are at stake.

How migration produces vulnerability

The executions also need to be considered within the broader structure of labour migration to Saudi Arabia. Anthropologist Nicholas De Genova offers a useful framework in his book Working the Boundaries: Race, Space, and “Illegality” in Mexican Chicago.

Studying Mexican migrants in the United States, De Genova argues that illegality is not simply a personal characteristic arising from an individual's decision to violate immigration rules. It is also a condition produced by the laws and institutions that regulate migration.

His central concept is deportability: the continuing possibility that a migrant can be detained and expelled. A worker does not need to experience deportation for that possibility to influence everyday decisions.

Someone who fears losing legal status may be reluctant to challenge an employer, demand unpaid wages, report workplace injuries or seek help from the authorities. The threat of deportation can therefore serve an economic function. It helps maintain a workforce that remains available but has limited bargaining power.

De Genova developed this argument in a different legal and political setting. The United States has immigration courts, established migrant rights organisations and pathways, however restrictive, to permanent residence and citizenship. The Gulf labour system operates differently.

Saudi Arabia has introduced reforms intended to improve job mobility and reduce some restrictions associated with the kafala sponsorship system. Nevertheless, migrant workers' legal status can remain closely connected to their employment circumstances.

For low-wage Bangladeshis, the consequences can be substantial. Many workers arrive after paying high recruitment fees. Some finance migration by borrowing money or selling family property. The debts they carry can make it difficult to leave abusive employers or return home.

Problems involving residence permits, employment contracts or sponsorship arrangements may place workers at risk of detention or deportation. In such circumstances, legal vulnerability becomes part of everyday working life.

Saudi authorities regularly announce arrests of foreign nationals for violations of residency, labour and border regulations. These enforcement operations serve legitimate regulatory purposes, but the possibility of detention can also discourage workers from approaching official institutions when they need assistance.

This is where De Genova's concept becomes relevant. The threat of deportation can influence far more people than the number actually deported. Legal insecurity also intersects with nationality and class.

Bangladeshis are heavily represented in lower-paid sectors of the Gulf labour market, including construction and cleaning. Their position is shaped by recruitment practices, occupational segregation, language barriers and differences in bargaining power.

These conditions do not mean every Bangladeshi worker experiences exploitation. But they help explain why some have limited capacity to defend their interests when disputes arise. There is also a social dimension.

Many migrants spend years separated from their spouses and children. They live in shared accommodation, often with little privacy, while maintaining households in Bangladesh through remittances. Community networks provide essential support. Workers from the same village or district may share rooms, arrange employment, lend money and assist one another during emergencies.

Yet those networks can also reinforce dependency through debt and informal obligations. The result is a form of migration in which economic opportunity coexists with substantial personal insecurity. None of these circumstances excuses criminal conduct or diminishes the importance of respecting religious institutions.

But they are relevant to understanding the lives of migrant workers whose alleged offences are judged within legal systems where they possess limited resources and influence.

What public punishment conceals

De Genova's work also introduces the concept of the “border spectacle.”

He uses it to describe how visible displays of immigration enforcement can direct public attention toward individual migrants and their supposed illegality while obscuring the legal and economic systems that produce their vulnerable status. The concept is useful when examining the public presentation of criminal punishment involving migrants.

In the Saudi case, the official account identifies the convicted individuals, characterises their alleged conduct as a violation of a mosque's sanctity and announces their executions. But it does not provide a comparable account of their circumstances or the safeguards available to them.

The public learns that two foreign nationals were punished. It learns much less about how they were represented, how they understood the proceedings or whether their government was informed. This does not establish that the executions were intended to intimidate migrant communities. There is insufficient evidence to make that claim.

But the imbalance in publicly available information is significant. The offence and punishment are visible. The defendants' experiences within the judicial process are largely invisible. That imbalance becomes more consequential when the accused are migrant workers.

Their families may live thousands of kilometres away. They may have limited access to lawyers, interpreters or official records. Their governments may lack reliable systems for monitoring serious criminal cases. The resulting information gap makes independent scrutiny difficult.

It also allows discussion to concentrate almost entirely on whether the accused violated local law, rather than whether the legal process provided adequate protections. These are separate questions.

A person can be accused of a serious offence and still be entitled to a fair trial, effective legal representation and access to consular assistance. Respect for Saudi Arabia's legal system does not require Bangladesh to abandon those concerns. Nor should religious sensitivities surrounding the alleged offence prevent scrutiny of the punishment.

The sanctity of a mosque is an important consideration for believers. But that consideration does not remove the obligation to examine whether a death sentence was proportionate and whether the proceedings met appropriate standards.

Bangladesh should seek the court records, the legal basis for the sentences and a full account of any consular communication. Without those documents, the government cannot credibly establish what happened or determine whether its citizens received the protections available to them.

Bangladesh's unused diplomatic leverage

The final issue is political.

Bangladesh's relationship with Saudi Arabia is often described in terms of mutual economic benefit. Saudi Arabia receives a large workforce. Bangladesh receives remittances that support households and contribute to its foreign exchange earnings.

The relationship also encompasses energy, investment, religious travel and diplomatic cooperation. Yet Bangladesh has not consistently demonstrated that the protection of migrant workers occupies the same priority as maintaining access to the Saudi labour market.

That imbalance becomes more difficult to justify when regional security cooperation enters the discussion. Recent political debate in Dhaka has included questions about closer security arrangements involving Saudi Arabia and other regional partners.

The precise terms and status of the reported arrangements require independent verification. But the broader question does not depend on any particular agreement. What does Bangladesh seek in return for its economic and diplomatic cooperation?

Labour migration gives Bangladesh a substantial stake in Saudi Arabia's economy. The number of Bangladeshis living and working in the kingdom is commonly estimated in the millions. That does not mean Bangladesh can dictate Saudi domestic policy. Nor does it mean Saudi Arabia would necessarily accept every demand.

It does mean Bangladesh has grounds to place migrant protection at the centre of bilateral negotiations. The government should begin with a binding or reliably implemented notification mechanism for serious criminal cases involving Bangladeshi citizens.

Whenever a Bangladeshi is detained on a charge carrying a possible death sentence, the relevant diplomatic mission should receive timely notification in accordance with applicable consular procedures.

The embassy or consulate should then be able to establish contact, facilitate access to legal assistance and ensure that the accused has appropriate interpretation. Bangladesh also needs a dedicated system for tracking criminal proceedings involving its nationals. Such a system should record arrests, charges, trial dates, appeals, sentences and requests for consular assistance. Families should have a clear channel through which they can seek information.

These are basic administrative requirements, not exceptional diplomatic concessions.

Bangladesh should also seek greater cooperation on labour disputes, residency problems and the misuse of sponsorship-related procedures. Workers who lose legal status because of employment disputes or administrative irregularities should have accessible mechanisms to regularise their position where permitted by law.

Recruitment practices deserve equal attention. High migration costs and debt reduce workers' freedom to challenge exploitation. Protecting workers abroad therefore requires reforms both in Saudi Arabia and in Bangladesh's own recruitment system.

The government must also examine the capacity of its diplomatic missions. How many officials assigned to labour and consular services are fluent in Arabic? How many have sufficient knowledge of Saudi criminal and labour law? What arrangements exist with qualified local lawyers?

How many Bangladeshis are currently detained in Saudi Arabia, and how many face capital charges? How many have received consular visits? These figures should be available to policymakers and, where privacy and legal restrictions permit, to the public.

Without them, the effectiveness of consular protection cannot be assessed. The October 14 executions also raise a more immediate set of questions. Did the Bangladesh Embassy in Riyadh or the Consulate in Jeddah know about the arrests? Were officials informed of the trials or convictions? Did either defendant request consular assistance?

If the missions were unaware of the proceedings, why did the notification system fail? If they were aware, what assistance was provided? The government should answer these questions publicly after obtaining the relevant records.

Bangladesh has spent decades celebrating overseas workers as “remittance warriors.” The description acknowledges their contribution to the economy, but it should not substitute for an enforceable commitment to their rights. Citizenship carries obligations that extend beyond national borders.

Those obligations do not disappear when a citizen is accused of a crime. They become particularly important when the possible punishment is death.

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The author is a PhD Candidate in Anthropology at UC Irvine, USA