The missing papers and unanswered orders behind Zia’s killing
The name of the man who allegedly shot President Ziaur Rahman has been in the historical record for four decades. It was Lt Col Matiur Rahman, a Bangladeshi army officer who took part in the military rebellion in Chattogram on May 30, 1981.
Anthony Mascarenhas identified him in his 1986 book, Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood. The journalist described Matiur firing a submachine gun at the president inside the Chattogram Circuit House, then shooting him again after he had fallen.
Another officer, Major Mozzafar Hossen, was close enough to witness the killing.
The account was detailed but it was also incomplete. It did not conclusively establish who had given the order, whether the original mission was to abduct or assassinate the president, or how much the other officers knew about the plan.
Forty-five years later, Mozzafar has resurfaced in the investigation.
A five-page report of his interrogation, obtained by Daily Waadaa, records his account of the military operation that ended in the assassination of Bangladesh's president.
Mozzafar identifies a man he calls “Moti” as the shooter, describes a convoy of four military vehicles and maintains that the original instructions were to take Zia to a military installation, not kill him.
The report also identifies gaps in the original inquiry, including the fate of confidential documents removed from the president's room, the absence of a complete ballistic record and the uncertain responsibilities of the officers involved.
It raises the possibility of a further criminal investigation under the original murder case, which was effectively closed in 2001.
Mozzafar's statements however have not been tested in a civilian criminal trial. His description of the operation may corroborate parts of earlier accounts, but it does not independently establish their accuracy.
The man in the third vehicle
Mozzafar's return to official custody began in July 2026, when detectives detained him in Dhaka after decades as a fugitive.
His name had appeared in the original proceedings following Zia's assassination. According to intelligence officials cited, a military court of inquiry had recommended that he face court-martial, but he disappeared before the proceedings could begin.
The arrest brought an old participant back into an investigation whose principal witnesses had largely disappeared from public view.
Tanvir Zoha, a prosecutor at the International Crimes Tribunal and chief investigator in the case, told Waadaa that Mozzafar was identified while investigators were examining the contacts of former army officer Lt Masud Uddin Chowdhury.
“We went looking for an earthworm and ended up finding a crocodile,” Tanvir said.
Investigators questioned Mozzafar in September. The five-page report obtained by Waadaa records several elements of his account, including the composition of the military convoy and the supposed objective of the mission.
Mozzafar said four vehicles carried the armed officers to the Circuit House. He travelled in the third. Moti, whom he identified as the man who shot Zia, travelled in the first.
The mission, he maintained, was initially intended to bring the president to the Chattogram Saluting Base or a military camp, where officers would present their grievances.
Mascarenhas earlier described confusion among some of the officers over the mission's purpose. His reconstruction placed Matiur Rahman as a shooter and placed Mozzafar nearby.
According to that account, Matiur fired at Zia with a submachine gun and continued shooting after the president collapsed. Mozzafar subsequently expressed shock, maintaining that he had understood the operation to be an attempt to remove the president rather than kill him.
One part of Mozzafar's testimony concerns events after the shooting. He acknowledged involvement in removing three bodies from the Circuit House, including Zia's, placing them in a vehicle and burying them together.
Here the surviving official record provides specific corroboration. The 1981 judicial commission established that the attackers initially left Zia's body at the Circuit House. At approximately 8:30 am, two army jeeps and a van equipped with automatic weapons returned to the building.
Three majors and between 10 and 15 soldiers entered. They confronted two National Security Intelligence officers, Abdus Sattar and Abul Kalam, who had remained at the scene.
The soldiers asked about confidential papers in the president's room. They searched the premises, gathered personal belongings and prepared to remove the bodies.
The commission recorded one officer calling to a man identified as Major Muzaffar and instructing him to bring bedsheets. The president's body was wrapped and carried downstairs.
The bodies of Lt Col AFM Moinul Ahsan and Captain Ashraful Hafiz Khan were also removed. All three were buried in a shallow grave on a hillside near Kaptai Road, in Pathargata village in Rangunia. Their remains were recovered after the rebellion collapsed.
The commission's account was based partly on testimony from the NSI officers who witnessed the removal. It places Mozzafar in a specific operation at a specific time. His new account can now be compared against testimony recorded while the events were still recent.
There is, however, a second question arising from the removal of the bodies. Why did the armed men search the president's room for confidential documents before taking the bodies away?
The investigation that stopped short of the conspiracy
The first official investigation began within days of Zia's death.
On June 6, 1981, acting President Justice Abdus Sattar appointed a judicial commission headed by former Chief Justice Ruhul Islam. Its other members were Justice Abu Taher Mohammad Afzal and Khulna District and Sessions Judge Syed Serajuddin Ahmed.
The commission began work on June 25 and eventually interviewed 62 witnesses, including army chief Lt Gen Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Its report was submitted in September 1981. It was not formally released to the public.
In July 2026, The Daily Star obtained a signed copy and published its findings, making available a detailed official reconstruction that had remained largely inaccessible for 45 years.
The commission documented the assault, the security failures surrounding the president and the conduct of officials in Chattogram. It also revealed a significant restriction on its own authority.
The commission had initially been instructed to determine whether the assassination resulted from a conspiracy. Its mandate included identifying the conspirators, examining their plans and motives, and establishing the involvement of those who assisted or encouraged the operation.
On June 13, 1981, the Home Ministry issued Notification No. 365-6/106/81-P1(IV), removing the provision that authorised this part of the investigation. The commission was instead directed to examine security arrangements, failures by responsible agencies, the removal of the president's body and the conduct of civilian officials.
The attack began at approximately 3:45 am with rockets fired at the Circuit House, followed by grenades and automatic gunfire. Armed officers entered through different staircases.
Zia, staying in Room No 4, opened a door and confronted the intruders. They fired at him. The post-mortem examination recorded 20 bullet wounds. His face, neck, chest and abdomen sustained extensive injuries, consistent with repeated automatic fire at close range.
The president's security arrangements should have presented a formidable obstacle. Police personnel, armed guards and members of the President's Guard Regiment were deployed around the Circuit House. Yet the attackers encountered little effective resistance.
The commission found serious shortcomings in the arrangements and questioned the conduct of officers responsible for the president's protection.
Particular attention fell on Lt Col Abu Yusuf Md Mahfuzur Rahman, Zia's personal secretary, who occupied a room near the president. The commission questioned why Mahfuzur had remained unharmed, why he had not responded more effectively during the attack and why he had failed to take adequate steps to secure the president's body afterward.
It also expressed concern about the conduct of Captain Mazharul Huq, the president's aide-de-camp, and Major Mujibur Rahman. Mahfuzur and Mujibur were among the officers executed in September 1981.
The commission found that intelligence agencies had been aware of the possibility of military unrest involving Major General Muhammad Abul Manzur, the senior commander in Chattogram.
But they had failed to anticipate the timing and scale of the rebellion.
Major General Mohabbat Jan Chowdhury, then director general of military intelligence, acknowledged that his organisation had not obtained adequate advance warning. The commission's central finding was a failure of presidential security.
Its report did not conclusively resolve the larger questions about the assassination's political and military planning. Those questions have now returned through Mozzafar's testimony.
The newly obtained interrogation report identifies several outstanding issues: the final order to kill Zia, the responsibilities of the officers involved, the fate of the confidential papers, the movement of the bodies and the identities of those who supported or sheltered the participants.
There are also gaps in the forensic record.
Although the post-mortem findings establish the nature and severity of the gunshot injuries, the new report identifies no complete preserved chain of ballistic evidence linking the bullets to particular firearms.
Weapon serial numbers, cartridge comparisons, firing distances and the handling of recovered projectiles would be important to any attempt to establish the precise sequence of shooting.
The executions and the unfinished criminal case
The military rebellion in Chattogram collapsed within days.
Major General Manzur, widely identified in historical accounts as the principal figure behind the uprising, was killed after the rebellion failed. His death removed a central participant before he could give a full account in court of the operation and the decisions that preceded it.
The military authorities proceeded with court-martial.
Thirty-one officers were accused in connection with the rebellion and assassination. Thirteen received death sentences. Others received prison terms, were dismissed from service or were acquitted.
Twelve officers were executed on September 23, 1981.
They included Brigadier Mohsin Uddin Ahmed, Colonel Nawazesh Uddin, Colonel Mohammad Abdur Rashid, Lt Col ATM Mahfuzur Rahman, Lt Col Md Delwar Hossain, Major AZ Giasuddin Ahmed, Major Rowshan Yazdani Bhuiyan, Major Kazi Mominul Haque, Major Md Mujibur Rahman, Captain Abdus Sattar, Captain Jamil Haque and Lieutenant Rafiqul Hasan Khan.
The executions followed military proceedings that attracted considerable controversy. Opposition politicians and families of the condemned questioned the process, while demonstrations took place in Dhaka.
The proceedings punished officers found responsible by military tribunals. They did not produce a comprehensive public account of the chain of command behind Zia's assassination.
Several participants, including Mozzafar and Matiur Rahman, escaped. The civilian murder investigation continued separately.
The original case was registered at Kotwali Police Station in Chattogram. The Criminal Investigation Department later assumed responsibility.
Over the following two decades, the investigation was repeatedly extended. In October 2001, the CID submitted a final report citing insufficient evidence and a shortage of witnesses.
The court accepted the report, effectively ending the investigation without a civilian criminal trial.
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