A shot at healing, a wound that won't close
A shot at healing, a wound that won't closeWaadaa Graphics

The problem with reconciliation

Bangladesh is debating how to face its violent past. Other nation's experience suggests that reconciliation without accountability can protect the institutions responsible for repression
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Bangladesh's political debate has been dominated by the prospect of Sheikh Hasina's return for months now. The ousted Prime Minister has said she and senior Awami League leaders intend to return from India in December. Home Minister Salahuddin Ahmed has responded that the party will not be allowed to resume its activities and that anyone returning in violation of the law will face arrest.

Alongside these competing declarations, the discussion of reconciliation has gained a renewed momentum.

Writing in two installments in Prothom Alo, Umme Wara argued that a society as divided as Bangladesh cannot resolve its differences through a single commission or political agreement. Reconciliation would require a sustained effort to establish coexistence and tolerance among competing political communities.

Columnist Altaf Parvez made a similar argument through a medical analogy. A difficult operation, he said, may be necessary to save a patient. Reconciliation, however painful, may be necessary to prevent another cycle of revenge.

The argument has an obvious appeal. Bangladesh has experienced successive periods of political repression, mass violence, period of unrest and disputed justice. Each transition has produced new demands for accountability, followed by arguments that the country must eventually move on.

Now, another demand has emerged alongside reconciliation: a truth commission.

Two years after the July 2024 uprising, Bangladesh still lacks a comprehensive public process for establishing the full record of abuses committed during the preceding 15 years. In May 2026, during the Week of the Disappeared, 13 domestic and international organisations called on the government to guarantee truth, justice, reparations and non-recurrence for victims of enforced disappearance.

The government's response to the existing Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances illustrates the difficulty.

Established by the interim administration, the commission conducted one of the most ambitious investigations into state repression in Bangladesh's history. It verified 1,569 cases of enforced disappearance. Of those victims, 1,282 eventually returned. At least 251 never returned and are presumed dead. The commission acknowledged that the actual number of victims was considerably higher.

Its central finding went beyond the individual cases. Enforced disappearance had not been an occasional abuse committed by rogue officers. It was a systematic, institutionalised and politically organised practice. The commission described it as “a crime of governance.”

It recommended comprehensive security-sector reform, dismantling the legal and administrative arrangements that enabled secret detention, and creating credible mechanisms to prosecute those responsible, regardless of rank.

The [BNP] government elected in February 2026 subsequently allowed relevant ordinances introduced by the interim administration to lapse. Its proposed replacement framework would leave investigations with the police and restrict the Human Rights Commission largely to requesting reports from the government or the heads of security agencies.

According to Netra News, the changes would effectively restore elements of the 2009 legal framework, under which government authorisation was required before investigating or arresting security personnel. Then came another allegation of enforced disappearance.

Human Rights Watch reported that Miraj Sheikh, a 30-year-old fisherman, was last seen in Coast Guard custody. Witnesses said Coast Guard personnel took him aboard a speedboat from Joymonir Ghol, near the Sundarbans in Mongla, on April 10, 2026. The Coast Guard denied detaining him.

Human Rights Watch described it as the first known case of enforced disappearance in nearly two years.

The sequence raises a question about the relationship between truth and political change. Bangladesh has documented the machinery of enforced disappearance. Yet the institutions responsible for preventing its recurrence remain contested. A reconciliation process would have to face that contradiction.

What truth commissions actually do

Historian Greg Grandin examined this problem in his essay The Instruction of Great Catastrophe, published in 2005. Drawing partly on his experience working with Guatemala's truth commission, he compared the approaches taken in Argentina, Chile and Guatemala following periods of state violence.

Truth commissions are generally established after prolonged repression or civil conflict. They collect testimony from victims and their families, investigate detention facilities and mass graves, document violations and produce an official account of the past.

South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission described its work as a bridge between a divided past and a future founded on human rights. Grandin questioned whether such commissions merely establish facts or also construct narratives useful to the political order that succeeds the violence.

His argument was that truth commissions are instruments of nation-building. They help societies explain the transition from an abusive political order to a supposedly reformed one. Such narratives are necessarily selective. They determine which events constitute the past, which institutions represent the future and which continuities deserve attention.

Grandin drew on Benedict Anderson's work on nationalism to explore the relationship between state formation, violence and collective memory. Political communities remember some forms of violence while suppressing others, particularly when a fuller account would challenge their founding narratives.

The differences between Argentina, Chile and Guatemala show how these choices affect accountability.

Argentina: Justice without political history

Argentina's military dictatorship, which ruled from 1976 to 1983, abducted and disappeared thousands of people.

After democracy returned, President Raúl Alfonsín established the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons. Its report, Nunca Más, or Never Again, documented 8,960 cases of enforced disappearance and referred 1,086 cases for judicial consideration.

Alfonsín's advisers, many of them legal scholars, believed prosecuting senior perpetrators would demonstrate that no one stood above the law. The subsequent Trial of the Juntas resulted in convictions, including life sentences for senior military commanders.

But the process largely avoided examining why the repression had occurred. The commission documented abductions, torture and killings without fully investigating the political and economic interests behind them. Who benefited from the dictatorship? Which political movements were being destroyed? What social order was the military attempting to preserve?

The democratic leadership feared that reopening these questions could deepen political divisions. Commission chairman Ernesto Sábato framed the central lesson around the importance of democracy as protection against state terror. That approach contributed to what became known as the theory of the two demons.

The report's opening narrative presented Argentina's violence as a confrontation between terrorism from the extreme left and the extreme right. The framing suggested a degree of equivalence between guerrilla organisations and the military state, even though the overwhelming majority of abuses documented by the commission were committed by state forces.

The victims included trade unionists, student leaders, journalists, priests working in poor communities and people whose connections to political activists were often indirect. Yet their political identities were largely stripped from the judicial narrative.

Researcher Julie Taylor observed that the trials treated the disappeared primarily as innocent individuals whose rights had been violated, rather than as political actors participating in collective struggles. The nuances mattered here. Many victims had been targeted precisely because of their political commitments and social relationships.

Taylor argued that the judicial process, by separating victims from those commitments, reproduced part of the military's effort to destroy political solidarity. Grandin's response was succinct: “That was exactly the point.”

The limits of Argentina's transition became apparent as the military resisted further accountability. Repeated military rebellions and threats contributed to the passage of the Full Stop Law in 1986, which curtailed new prosecutions. The Due Obedience Law followed in 1987, shielding many lower-ranking officers on the grounds that they had followed orders.

In 1990, President Carlos Menem pardoned convicted military leaders as part of a policy presented as national reconciliation. Argentina had established a substantial factual record and secured important convictions. Yet the political settlement subsequently protected many perpetrators.

Reconciliation became one of the arguments used to justify impunity.

Chile: History becomes an explanation for impunity

Chile followed a different path.

General Augusto Pinochet overthrew the elected socialist president Salvador Allende in 1973 and ruled for 17 years. When Chile returned to civilian government in 1990, Pinochet retained considerable institutional power. He remained commander of the army, the military's amnesty protections survived, and the constitutional arrangements preserved positions of influence for figures associated with the dictatorship.

President Patricio Aylwin established the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation. His governing principle was to pursue truth and justice “to the extent possible.”

The commission was not designed as a mechanism for criminal prosecution. It therefore carried much of the responsibility for constructing an authoritative account of Chile's recent history. Its explanation placed the country's political violence within the global divisions of the Cold War.

International ideological conflict had intensified domestic polarisation. The left and right had become increasingly radicalised. Each believed it was acting defensively against the other.

The resulting narrative portrayed violence as an escalation of fear, hatred and mutual suspicion. Grandin argued that this explanation obscured questions about political power and material interests.

The violence appeared as a national crisis that had developed almost independently of conscious political decisions. The account gave insufficient attention to who controlled the state, who benefited from repression and what political objectives the coup achieved.

One revealing detail concerned the drafting process. An early version of the historical narrative was written by Gonzalo Vial, a conservative historian who had served under Pinochet. The report's account also suggested that Chile had been approaching civil war before the military intervened.

That interpretation risked presenting the coup as both a grave violation and an intervention that had prevented something worse. Grandin saw this as a form of historical justification for impunity.

The commission documented victims and acknowledged abuses, but its explanation of the political crisis could also accommodate the arguments of those responsible for the dictatorship. Chile's experience demonstrated that a truth commission can establish a record of suffering without adequately challenging the political structures that produced it.

Guatemala: The importance of asking why

Guatemala's truth commission took a more expansive approach despite operating under severe restrictions.

The country had endured nearly four decades of civil war. The Commission for Historical Clarification collected testimony from more than 8,000 people and documented 626 massacres. It estimated that approximately 200,000 people had been killed or disappeared during the conflict.

Its findings attributed 93% of documented violations to state forces and associated groups, and 3% to guerrilla organisations. The evidence did not support an account in which both sides were equally responsible.

The commission had limited formal powers. It could not compel witnesses to appear, could not name individual perpetrators in its findings and could not make its report directly binding in criminal proceedings. Nevertheless, it produced a more searching analysis of the origins of violence than its counterparts in Argentina and Chile.

Grandin identified several reasons.

The commission's mandate left sufficient room for investigators to examine historical causes. International commissioners had less incentive to produce a reassuring national narrative. Guatemalan human rights organisations rejected the assumption that declaring national unity would resolve entrenched injustice.

Most importantly, Indigenous Maya organisations insisted that the violence could not be understood without examining racism. The commission traced the relationship between the Guatemalan state, landownership and forced labour to the nineteenth century.

Coffee plantation owners had used state power to dispossess Maya communities and secure their labour. Resistance was repeatedly met with repression. The commission concluded that the civil war's violence reflected longstanding structural inequalities rather than a temporary collapse of political order.

This produced a different interpretation of the relationship between state formation and violence. Where other commissions suggested that atrocities followed the weakening of state institutions, Guatemala's commission showed how state institutions had been built and consolidated through coercion.

Between 1981 and 1983, the military carried out hundreds of massacres in Maya communities. Children were killed, villagers were burned alive and entire settlements were destroyed. The commission connected these atrocities to the military's National Plan for Security and Development.

The strategy combined the destruction of areas considered sympathetic to insurgents with subsequent constitutional reform, elections, anti-corruption measures and diplomatic normalisation. Grandin described the relationship between coercion and political reconstruction through the concept of “strategic democracy.”

The military's programme did not simply precede democratisation. Its violence and institutional reforms formed parts of a connected political project. This historical analysis also helped the commission establish that acts of genocide had occurred against Maya groups.

Genocide requires evidence of intent to destroy a protected group, in whole or in part. Guatemalan officials had argued that the military campaign was a national-security operation against insurgents.

The commission examined how generations of racial discrimination had shaped land relations, labour exploitation and state power. It found that the military's treatment of Maya communities could not be explained solely through counterinsurgency. Racism had made entire populations vulnerable to extermination.

When the commission presented its report at Guatemala's National Theatre in February 1999, military officers and government officials occupied the front rows. Behind them sat victims, relatives and representatives of Indigenous organisations.

The commission's chairman explained that the violence could not be reduced to a conflict between two armed groups. It had to be understood through the country's social structures.

The audience responded with tears and applause. The president declined to receive the report publicly on stage. Grandin interpreted the moment as evidence that acknowledgement did not necessarily require the suppression of political divisions. There, for victims, recognition came from an official account that identified the structures responsible for their suffering.

Subsequent governments did not fully implement the commission's recommendations. Human rights organisations nevertheless used its findings to support demands for accountability. The report became a resource for political and legal action beyond the commission's original mandate.

Grandin concluded his analysis by drawing on historian Arno Mayer's distinction between founding violence and conserving violence. Founding violence establishes a political order. Conserving violence maintains it.

Truth commissions often treat founding violence as a completed historical episode while paying insufficient attention to the laws, security institutions and systems of impunity through which coercion continues. But victims have repeatedly challenged that division.

After Pinochet's arrest in London in 1998, Chilean lawyers argued that enforced disappearance remained a continuing crime until the fate of the victim was established. That interpretation opened legal routes around older amnesty provisions. The persistence of victims and their families helped restore possibilities for accountability that earlier political settlements had attempted to close.

Bangladesh's unfinished account of 1971

Bangladesh's experience contains elements of all three cases, but its history of transitional justice began much earlier.

Following independence, the new state introduced the Bangladesh Collaborators Order in 1972 and the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act in 1973. The legislation represented an early attempt to establish a domestic framework for prosecuting international crimes, only decades after the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals.

The effort was interrupted by diplomatic negotiations, political amnesties and subsequent changes of government. Three developments were particularly consequential.

The first concerned Pakistan's own investigation into the war. In December 1971, Pakistan established the Hamoodur Rahman Commission under its chief justice to investigate the circumstances of its military defeat. The commission recommended action against several senior officers. Its findings remained secret for nearly three decades before portions were leaked in 2000.

Its recommendations were not implemented.

The inquiry was primarily concerned with Pakistan's defeat and the failures of its military leadership rather than providing a comprehensive account of atrocities committed in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, Pakistan had produced an official investigation.

Bangladesh, despite being the principal site of the atrocities, has never established a comprehensive truth commission covering the full history of 1971, including the experiences of all affected communities.

The second development concerned the 195 Pakistani military officers Bangladesh identified for prosecution. The 1973 tribunal legislation was developed partly with those prosecutions in mind. But the cases became entangled in negotiations involving Bangladesh, India and Pakistan.

The 1972 Simla Agreement had established a framework for India and Pakistan to address postwar disputes, including prisoners of war and the Line of Control in Kashmir.

The 1974 tripartite Delhi Agreement subsequently provided for the repatriation of the 195 officers without trials in Bangladesh, alongside arrangements concerning diplomatic recognition and the return of stranded populations. The prosecution of suspected war criminals became part of a broader diplomatic settlement.

In Argentina and Chile, accountability had been restricted partly by the continuing influence of domestic military institutions. In Bangladesh, international negotiations helped determine the limits of prosecution.

The third development involved the Collaborators Order.

Approximately 37,000 people were arrested or accused under the legislation. In November 1973, the government announced a general amnesty that excluded serious offences such as murder, rape and arson. Many detainees were released. The law was repealed following the political changes of 1975.

The early state had used both prosecution and amnesty to manage the aftermath of independence. The resulting settlement left substantial parts of the historical record contested. Denial of wartime responsibility continued among political organisations associated with opposition to independence, including sections of the Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami.

Violence against Urdu-speaking Biharis also received limited attention in the dominant national account. And that omission matters.

Sections of the Bihari population supported the Pakistani military in 1971, and some participated in atrocities in areas including Mirpur and Mohammadpur. But Bihari civilians were themselves subjected to massacres and retaliatory violence.

During March and April 1971, killings occurred in Santahar, Khulna, Mymensingh, Chattogram and elsewhere. Violence against Biharis continued after Pakistan's surrender in December. Accounts of the scale of killings in Khulna include claims that an exceptionally large proportion of the local Bihari population was killed, although precise figures remain disputed.

In the following decades, large numbers of Urdu-speaking people lived in camps amid prolonged uncertainty over citizenship and political status. An adequate historical account must examine both the participation of some Biharis in atrocities and the collective violence inflicted upon Bihari communities.

Acknowledging one does not diminish the other.

The limits of healing

Muhammad Asadullah, a criminologist at Canada's University of Regina, recently proposed a different framework for Bangladesh in an essay published by Daily Waadaa.

He identified three major historical wounds: the Liberation War of 1971, the conflict in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the July 2024 uprising. Each, he argued, requires a separate Truth and Healing Commission. His proposed sequence begins with July, followed by 1971 and then the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Much of his argument is persuasive.

Bangladesh has frequently responded to historical violence either by avoiding accountability or by pursuing criminal punishment without a broader process of public acknowledgement.

Neither approach has adequately addressed the experiences of victims. Asadullah's choice of terminology is particularly important. He prefers “healing” to “reconciliation” because reconciliation can impose expectations on people who have suffered serious abuses.

Victims may be asked to forgive perpetrators who have never acknowledged responsibility, apologised or even admitted that the crimes occurred. When reconciliation becomes an official objective, the state can effectively demand forgiveness according to a political timetable.

Asadullah also understands recurring political violence partly through the persistence of unresolved trauma.

That interpretation gives victims a central place in the process. It recognises that their experiences deserve documentation even when perpetrators refuse to participate. But healing has its own limitations.

The Latin American experience shows that moving from legal and institutional analysis into the language of morality and collective trauma can obscure the political causes of repression. Describing enforced disappearance as a national trauma may suggest that the entire society suffered in the same way.

It did not.

Disappearances were carried out through identifiable agencies, legal arrangements and political decisions. Some people exercised power, others benefited from it, and specific groups were targeted. A healing commission that fails to identify those relationships risks producing the kind of depoliticised account found in Chile.

Guatemala's commission offered a different model. It examined victims' suffering while identifying the institutions and historical structures that made the violence possible.

There is a second concern.

A victim-centred process can document suffering without adequately confronting the denial of those responsible. In Bangladesh, the Awami League's continuing refusal to acknowledge responsibility for many abuses cannot simply remain outside the commission's analysis.

Victims' testimony must be heard, but the official and political narratives used to deny their experiences must also be examined. The third concern involves sequencing. Beginning with July is practical. Evidence is recent, witnesses remain available and public attention is focused on the uprising.

But the first commission's interpretation may establish the framework for those that follow.

If a July commission treats the violence solely as the work of the Awami League while excluding the longer histories of RAB, DGFI, the police and anti-terrorism legislation, it may reproduce Bangladesh's earlier approach to accountability. The names of the perpetrators would change, but the institutional foundations of repression would remain insufficiently examined.

A July commission should therefore investigate the 15 years of enforced disappearance that preceded the uprising and the development of the security apparatus that enabled those abuses. That apparatus cannot be understood as the creation or property of one political party alone.

The fourth concern is decolonisation.

Asadullah argues that Bangladesh should develop its commissions through its own cultural traditions, historical experiences and spiritual resources rather than simply reproducing European models. There is considerable value in that approach.

But local cultural legitimacy does not eliminate the danger of selective national narratives. A commission grounded in indigenous traditions can still become an instrument through which the state constructs a convenient account of its own history.

The central issue is not whether the commission follows a Western or non-Western model. It is whether the process identifies responsibility, confronts denial and investigates the structures that allowed violence to occur.

The wounds preceding independence

Asadullah identifies three major wounds. Bangladesh's historical experience suggests a wider field of inquiry. Partition in 1947 displaced millions across Bengal and neighbouring regions. Hindus migrated from East Bengal to India, while Muslims arrived from Bihar, Assam and West Bengal. These movements were accompanied by killings, sexual violence, dispossession and the destruction of communities.

Many Urdu-speaking migrants and their descendants subsequently became identified as Biharis or Muhajirs. The social consequences of Partition have never been comprehensively documented through a Bangladeshi state-led truth process. In 1950, anti-Hindu violence in Dhaka, Barishal and other areas caused deaths and contributed to further migration.

Major anti-Hindu riots occurred again in 1964.

These events formed part of a longer history in which religious identity, state policy and political competition shaped the security of minority communities. The period also witnessed violent conflict between Bengali and Bihari industrial workers.

In 1954, clashes at Adamjee Jute Mills and Karnaphuli Paper Mills resulted in large numbers of deaths, including Bihari workers. These confrontations involved competition over employment, wages, language and political influence. They reflected ethnic and class inequalities that developed within Pakistan's economic and administrative structures. Understanding these events is essential to explaining the relationship between Bengali and Bihari communities during 1971.

The history of Bihari participation in pro-Pakistan violence cannot be separated entirely from the preceding decades of conflict. Neither can earlier attacks on Biharis be used to excuse their participation in atrocities.

Both histories require examination. They also complicate the idea that Bangladesh's principal historical wounds can be reduced to three discrete episodes. The country has experienced a continuing interaction between founding violence and conserving violence across successive political orders.

That history extends beyond the creation of Pakistan in 1947. Its roots lie in colonial rule and the transformation of landownership, labour and political authority in Bengal.

Colonialism and the question of beneficiaries

Anthropologist Deborah Thomas approaches historical injustice from a different direction in her book Exceptional Violence.

In the chapter “Repairing Bodies,” she examines a paragraph removed from a draft declaration prepared for the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban. A coalition of 21 countries had proposed that victims of slavery, the slave trade and colonialism, along with their descendants, should receive reparations.

Responsibility would extend beyond states to companies and individuals who had benefited from these systems. The proposed remedies included development funding, improved access to international markets, foreign-debt cancellation and the return of looted cultural objects and historical documents.

The paragraph did not survive into the final declaration. But Thomas argues that its formulation recognised colonial harm as economic, political and cultural, and located responsibility among the beneficiaries of historical exploitation. The international debate over reparations has since developed considerably.

CARICOM established a reparations commission to pursue claims against former European colonial powers. Jamaica formed its own reparations commission in 2009 under anthropologist Barry Chevannes. In 2021, Germany formally acknowledged the colonial genocide committed against the Herero and Nama peoples in Namibia.

European museums have faced increasing demands to return cultural objects acquired through colonial conquest and exploitation. These initiatives seek to establish how historical systems of racial domination continue to shape contemporary inequalities. Thomas treats reparations not simply as financial compensation but as a way of understanding the historical origins of present conditions.

Her analysis includes an important contradiction. While Jamaica was demanding reparations from Britain for slavery, Rastafarians were demanding reparations from the Jamaican state for the Coral Gardens violence of 1963. The postcolonial state occupied two positions simultaneously.

It was a claimant seeking redress for colonial injustice and an institution responsible for violence against its own citizens. Bangladesh faces a similar contradiction. It can legitimately seek an accounting from Britain for colonial extraction and from Pakistan for the atrocities of 1971.

It can also examine how the economic surplus generated under the colonial zamindari system was distributed and who retained its benefits. But the Bangladeshi state must also confront its responsibilities towards Biharis, Indigenous communities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Hindu minorities and families affected by enforced disappearance.

Claims for justice against external powers cannot substitute for accountability within the country. The two processes must proceed together.

Bengal's longer history of dispossession

The colonial transformation of Bengal provides an important starting point.

During the Bengal famine of 1770, a substantial proportion of the population died while the East India Company continued its revenue demands. In 1793, Lord Cornwallis introduced the Permanent Settlement, recognising zamindars as landholders responsible for fixed revenue payments to the colonial government.

The arrangement strengthened the power of landed intermediaries and intensified the vulnerability of many cultivators. Peasants who worked the land were subjected to rent obligations within a system that frequently restricted their security and bargaining power.

The consequences shaped Bengal's agrarian society for generations. Land concentration, indebtedness and unequal access to agricultural resources became enduring features of rural life. Resistance took many forms.

The Faraizi movement mobilised sections of Bengal's Muslim peasantry against oppressive agrarian practices. Colonial authorities also suppressed movements associated with Islamic reform and anti-colonial resistance, sometimes through prosecutions described as Wahhabi trials.

The Bengal famine of 1943 exposed another dimension of colonial political economy. Millions died amid wartime disruption, inflation, food procurement policies, failures of distribution and administrative decisions that intensified shortages.

These episodes differed in their immediate causes, but they were connected by the relationship between political authority, land, labour and access to resources. The abolition of zamindari after Partition altered formal ownership arrangements.

It did not eliminate landlessness or the social inequalities that had developed through the colonial agrarian system. This raises a question that conventional truth commissions have often neglected.

Who benefited?

Political theorist Mahmood Mamdani raised this issue in his criticism of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The commission concentrated heavily on the relationship between perpetrators and victims: who had tortured, detained or killed whom.

Mamdani argued that understanding apartheid required examining another relationship, between beneficiaries and victims. Apartheid had not only enabled particular officials to commit abuses. It had distributed land, wealth, employment and political advantages across society.

A process focused on individual perpetrators could establish responsibility for specific crimes while leaving those broader distributions of advantage largely untouched. The same analytical distinction applies to colonial Bengal.

Which families, classes and institutions benefited from the Permanent Settlement and subsequent patterns of landownership? How were those advantages transmitted across generations? Which contemporary inequalities can be traced to colonial policies, and which emerged through later political decisions? These questions require historical research rather than assumptions about inherited guilt.

But they are necessary to understand how past systems continue to influence present conditions.

The history of landlessness in Bangladesh cannot be explained solely through individual acts of dispossession. It must also be examined through the institutional arrangements that made dispossession possible and preserved its consequences.

Repair as a continuing process

The scale of this historical inquiry creates a practical problem.

A single commission could not comprehensively investigate colonial rule, Partition, the Liberation War, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, successive periods of authoritarian government and the violence surrounding the July uprising. Three commissions would face similar limitations. Even ten would leave significant questions unresolved.

Thomas offers a way to understand the problem without abandoning the pursuit of justice. She argues that the damage caused by slavery and colonialism is, in an important sense, irreparable. The institutions through which contemporary societies operate were themselves shaped by those historical processes.

Complete restitution would require undoing transformations that have become embedded in political, economic and social life. Yet the impossibility of complete restitution does not make reparations meaningless. Thomas distinguishes between two levels of response.

The first is practical.

States and institutions can acknowledge wrongdoing, provide compensation, return property or cultural objects, reform discriminatory arrangements and establish mechanisms to prevent further abuses. These measures are necessarily incomplete, but they can produce material improvements and official recognition.

The second level concerns the kind of society people seek to create.

Thomas describes this as repair: an ongoing effort to develop social relationships and institutions that do not reproduce the harms being addressed. Repair differs from a conventional legal settlement. A reparations agreement can be treated as the discharge of a liability. Once compensation is paid, the responsible institution may argue that the matter has been resolved.

That approach becomes inadequate when the consequences of historical injustice continue. Repair recognises that acknowledgement, compensation and institutional change may need to occur over generations.

Now for Bangladesh, all these nuances and distinctions matter. A Truth and Healing Commission should not be designed to produce a definitive national settlement after which historical grievances are considered closed. It should establish a credible factual record, identify perpetrators and beneficiaries, examine institutional responsibility and recommend changes that can be assessed over time.

It should also recognise that different communities have experienced different forms of violence.

The victims of enforced disappearance, survivors of the Liberation War, Bihari communities, Indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts and those affected by communal violence cannot be incorporated into a single undifferentiated account of national suffering. Their histories overlap, but they are not identical. Nor should reconciliation be made a condition of participation.

Victims may seek prosecution, compensation, acknowledgement, institutional reform or simply an authoritative public record. Some may wish to forgive. Others may not. A credible process must accommodate those differences.

The July 2024 uprising created an opportunity to reconsider Bangladesh's relationship with state violence. The Enforced Disappearances Commission has already demonstrated that an official inquiry can identify systematic abuses and the institutions through which they operated.

The more difficult question is whether the state is prepared to act on such findings when doing so requires limiting the powers of institutions it continues to depend upon. That is also the central lesson of the Latin American experience.

Argentina established important truths but initially restricted the political history surrounding them. Chile documented suffering while accommodating elements of the dictatorship's account of its own actions. Guatemala went further by examining the structural origins of violence, although implementation remained incomplete.

None offers a simple model for Bangladesh.

Together, they show why a truth commission's value cannot be measured only by the number of victims it documents or the moral language of its final report. Its findings must help explain how violence was organised, who authorised it, who benefited from it and which arrangements continue to make similar abuses possible.

Bangladesh's debate over reconciliation is therefore inseparable from its debate over the state itself.

A commission concerned only with July would leave much of the preceding history unexplained. A process that addressed 1971 without examining the experiences of minorities would remain incomplete. An inquiry into colonial dispossession that ignored the postcolonial state's own conduct would reproduce another form of selective memory.

No commission can resolve all these questions. But a credible process can establish where responsibility lies, preserve evidence, challenge denial and create a basis for continuing institutional reform. Reconciliation may eventually emerge from that work. It cannot replace it.

The very purpose of confronting the past is not to produce an agreed national story. It is to establish a record that remains credible even when its findings are inconvenient to the government, the opposition or the institutions responsible for investigating themselves.

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The author is a PhD Candidate in Anthropology at UC Irvine, USA