The "Bangladesh first" gambit

For more than half a century, Bangladesh’s foreign policy was an exercise in regime survival. Born out of a bloody war in 1971, the infant state found itself cradled—and swiftly constrained—by the strategic embrace of India. 

Delhi’s assistance in the war of independence was a rational move for a regional heavyweight, creating a friendly eastern neighbor. Yet this security guarantee came with an implicit price: Dhaka was expected to remain a compliant market, outsourcing its broader geopolitical anxieties to its larger neighbor. 

The lofty ideals of self-rule that animated the liberation struggle were quietly replaced by a parochial scramble for the domestic power structures vacated by Pakistan. Under the platitudinous banner of "friendship with all, enmity with none," national security was shriveled into the narrow protection of ruling clans.

The resulting political landscape devolved into a bitter, decades-long tennis match between two rival dynasties. While these families focused on securing their respective bloodlines, the country’s economic survival was left to the resilience of the masses. 

It was ordinary citizens who built a dominant garment industry and sent home the billions in remittances that kept the state solvent. True national development was routinely subverted by a form of crony capitalism where the ruling elite viewed the state treasury as a family fiefdom. 

Strategic foresight was a luxury sacrificed on the altar of dynastic longevity. For fifty-five years, Bangladesh limped along, perpetually anxious about offending its powerful neighbors or global superpowers.

This systemic timidity left the state structurally weak. While the remittance economy grew, it was constantly bled by illicit capital flight as elites siphoned wealth across borders. The military grew in headcount and peacetime comfort but withered in doctrine and material power. 

Diverted into domestic policing roles and lulled by a premature sense of regional harmony, the armed forces lost their defensive edge. UN peacekeeping missions, while prestigious, subtly reoriented the military’s institutional psychology from preparing for conflict to chasing lucrative overseas deployments. 

Meanwhile, genuine external challenges, such as a volatile Myanmar, were largely ignored to avoid complicating relations with bigger regional players.

The mass uprising of 2024 shattered this stagnant status quo. In its wake, the current administration has initiated a sharp break from routine, engineering an aggressive foreign policy that explicitly links economic development with robust national security. 

Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s recent diplomatic itinerary—marked by a pivotal visit to Malaysia followed quickly by a high-stakes trip to Beijing—signals a clear embrace of a "Bangladesh First" doctrine. The shift represents a fundamental psychological transition from a state begging for foreign aid to one actively cultivating strategic leverage.

Central to this recalibration is an unapologetic engagement with China, the only partner with the capital and engineering capacity to match Bangladesh’s massive infrastructure, water management, and digital economy needs. 

Rather than stepping gingerly around Delhi's sensitivities, Dhaka is moving decisively. The approval of the Chinese Economic Zone in Anwara and the push for a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement demonstrate a desire for deep integration. 

Crucially, Bangladesh is now seeking Chinese backing for the long-delayed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Plan, a project of immense ecological and economic significance.

This pragmatism extends to the country’s eastern frontier. By signaling its intent to join the China-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor, Dhaka is attempting to break a decades-long diplomatic deadlock. 

The move seeks to unlock fresh trade routes while simultaneously leveraging Beijing’s unique influence over Naypyidaw to finally resolve the protracted Rohingya refugee crisis.

The most explicit sign of this new assertiveness, however, is in defense procurement. The Prime Minister’s decision to secure a deal for advanced Chinese J-10 fighter aircraft for the air force is a direct statement of sovereign intent. 

It indicates that Bangladesh is no longer content with a military built merely for peacekeeping; it is seeking a credible conventional deterrent.

This geopolitical pivoting enjoys broad domestic consensus, backed by a populace eager to see the country emerge from the shadow of regional hegemons. Yet for this "Bangladesh First" policy to succeed over the long term, the government must ensure that its external boldness is matched by internal institutional reform. 

Development cannot be sustained without a parallel strengthening of the state's internal organs.

Politics must be secured so that institutional democracy can finally outgrow dynastic entitlement. The financial sector requires stringent regulation to plug the legal and illegal loopholes that permit devastating capital flight. Society must be anchored in ethical governance to resist the twin threats of polarization and extremism. 

Finally, the military must be allowed to return to its core professional mandate: guarding the nation’s sovereignty and securing the state’s developmental ambitions. Dhaka’s new strategy is a high-stakes gamble, but it is one that a hungry, modernizing nation can no longer afford to avoid.

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Brig Gen AF Jaglul Ahmed, ndc, psc, PhD (Retd) contributes to national dailies. He can be reached at jagglulahmed@gmail.com