The sands of time, the stories we tell
The sands of time, the stories we tellWaadaa Graphics

The battle over Bangladesh’s past is a battle over its future

The rise and decline of Shahbag offers a lesson in how political narratives are constructed, challenged and ultimately lose their hold on public opinion
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History is not written from facts alone. It is shaped by the narratives that give those facts meaning. These nuances matter very much in Bangladesh as here, competing interpretations of the country's founding and its recent history have become central to the struggle for power.

Facts and narratives are often treated as separate, even opposing, concepts. But they are closely connected. Facts provide the material from which history is constructed. Narratives organise that material into explanations that people can understand, remember and, eventually, act upon.

A collection of facts does not necessarily produce a coherent understanding of events. Facts require context and a sense of their relationship to one another. Some are disputed. Others acquire different meanings depending on the historical or political framework in which they are presented.

This is why political arguments are rarely settled by establishing individual facts. A dominant narrative cannot be effectively challenged by presenting disconnected evidence. It requires an alternative interpretation capable of explaining the same events more convincingly.

Bangladesh's experience with the Shahbag movement possibly explains this dynamic.

Shahbag and the rise of a counter-narrative

When Shahbag emerged in February 2013, it drew on a political and cultural narrative that had developed over more than four decades. At its core was a particular understanding of the Liberation War, Bengali nationalism, secularism and the political legitimacy derived from those ideas.

Sheikh Hasina's government recognised the political potential of this narrative.

The movement initially mobilised substantial public support around demands for accountability for crimes committed during the 1971 Liberation War. But it also became part of a broader political confrontation involving the Awami League, Jamaat-e-Islami, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and competing visions of the country's national identity.

To Hasina, Shahbag presented an opportunity to reinforce the ideological foundations of her government while placing her political opponents on the defensive.

The political consequences were particularly severe for Jamaat, whose leaders were facing war crimes trials. The BNP, too, found itself facing a political environment in which opposition to the movement could be portrayed as opposition to the ideals of the Liberation War. Yet Shahbag also produced an unintended consequence.

Its opponents began developing a counter-narrative that challenged not only the movement's political objectives but also the government's claim to represent the authoritative interpretation of Bangladesh's history and national identity.

The emergence of Hefazat-e-Islam as a major political force was one manifestation of this reaction. That ultimately culminated in the events surrounding Shapla Square in May 2013, only months after the Shahbag protests began. The government eventually sought to contain both the Shahbag mobilisation and the forces that had emerged in opposition to it.

The political significance of these events extended beyond the immediate confrontation. Shahbag demonstrated the limits of a political narrative that enjoyed extensive institutional, cultural and governmental support but struggled to secure acceptance across the country's increasingly divided political landscape.

The movement's organisational legacy also proved less durable than its initial prominence might have suggested.

By contrast, many of the individuals and political constituencies that opposed Shahbag continued to operate within a loose, often contradictory alignment. They differed substantially in ideology and social outlook. The thing connecting them was less a shared programme than a common opposition to the political order and ideological framework associated with Hasina.

This difference helps explain an important feature of Bangladesh's subsequent political development. The Awami League retained overwhelming institutional power, particularly after the disputed 2014 election. It could control electoral competition, restrict opposition activity and use the machinery of the state to suppress dissent.

But political dominance did not necessarily translate into narrative dominance. Indeed, the two increasingly diverged.

The government's accounts of the Liberation War, economic development, counterterrorism and political stability faced sustained challenges from opponents who questioned the relationship between its stated principles and its conduct in power.

Political dominance, narrative decline

The development narrative, for example, had considerable material foundations. Bangladesh experienced substantial economic growth and improvements in several social indicators during Hasina's tenure. Yet critics increasingly placed those achievements alongside allegations of corruption, weakened institutions, electoral manipulation and the concentration of political power.

Similarly, the government's counterterrorism narrative was challenged by questions about enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and the treatment of political opponents. The facts themselves did not always change. But the framework through which growing sections of the public interpreted them had changed.

The same development statistics could be presented as evidence of effective governance or examined alongside the institutional and political costs of the government's economic model. The same appeals to national stability could be understood as a justification for continuity or as an argument used to discourage democratic competition.

This was the central challenge confronting Hasina's political communication strategy. Her government could ensure that its preferred narrative dominated state institutions and much of the conventional public sphere. It could not ensure that citizens accepted that narrative.

The expansion of social media made this problem more difficult. Unlike traditional media institutions, digital platforms allowed loosely organised networks of activists, commentators and ordinary citizens to challenge official accounts without comparable financial resources or organisational structures.

These networks were fragmented and frequently disagreed among themselves. Their arguments were not always accurate or consistent. Nevertheless, they created alternative channels through which political events could be interpreted and debated.

The government's response increasingly relied on legal and coercive instruments, including the Digital Security Act. Such measures could constrain expression and impose costs on dissent. They could not, by themselves, restore the credibility of the government's political arguments.

In some respects, the reliance on restrictive legislation revealed the limits of its ability to persuade. The distinction between controlling public discussion and winning public consent became increasingly consequential.

By the time Hasina's government fell amid the mass uprising of 2024, the Awami League had spent years maintaining political control while facing growing challenges to the narratives through which it justified that control.

It would be an oversimplification to attribute the government's eventual collapse to Shahbag or to the counter-narratives that followed it. Economic grievances, political repression, institutional failures and the immediate events of the uprising were all important.

But Shahbag marked an early and significant moment in the wider contest over political legitimacy. It demonstrated that a government could mobilise a powerful historical narrative and still provoke a counter-movement capable of reshaping public debate.

The implications extend into the post-Hasina period.

Those who once defended the Awami League's political and historical narratives may seek to re-establish their influence. Their opponents, meanwhile, face the challenge of explaining the country's recent past without reproducing the same tendency to treat one political interpretation as the only legitimate one.

Neither side can resolve that contest simply by assembling favourable facts or dismissing inconvenient ones.

A credible narrative must account for evidence that complicates its central claims. It must also distinguish between established facts, contested interpretations and political judgments.

This is particularly important in Bangladesh, where the history of 1971, the legacy of authoritarian rule and the meaning of the 2024 uprising will continue to influence political identities for generations.

The records being produced today — court proceedings, official documents, investigative reporting, personal testimony and digital archives — will provide the material from which future histories are written. But those records will not speak for themselves.

They will be selected, interpreted, connected and contested. Some accounts will become influential because they offer convincing explanations. Others will endure because institutions and political interests continue to promote them.

The lesson of Shahbag is not that facts are unimportant or that the most effective narrative necessarily represents the truth. It is that political legitimacy depends partly on whether a narrative can withstand scrutiny beyond the constituency already committed to believing it.

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Nayel Rahman is a political analyst